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Foreword 
Agricultural reqearch and development programs in developing coun­
tries and the donor agencies that support them generally allocate more
 
resources to seed programs than to any other aspect of potato improvement.
 
The result have been mixed. Most efforts to establish conventional seed
 
potato 'ertification programs have encountered serious obstacles, both
 
technical and institutional. Few seed certification programs have been
 
able to produce more than a small portion of the seed that farmers need to
 
plant each year. After an initial period of growth, often based on
 
foreign funding and technical assistance, many seed programs have
 
collapsed when foreign support was withdrawn.
 
The Republic of Korea's early attempts at seed certification were no
 
exception to this general rule. However, through persistence, discipline,
 
and application of advanced techniques for in vitro multiplication and
 
virus testing of potatoes, Korea's Seed Potato Certification Program has
 
become a remarkable success.
 
This report summarizes the main features of the Korean experience; it
 
outlines the seed program's technical and institutional arrangements; it
 
indicates the magnitude of the program's costs and benefits; and it Iden­
tifies some important issues that still face the program's managers. A
 
central conclusion is that the seed prograw's impact, stemming p:Imarily
 
from technical innovation, could now be extended by turning greater
 
responsibility for seed production over to the private sector and by
 
expanding efforts in the areas of breeding, post-harvest technology, and
 
on-farm research.
 
The report's findings should be of interest not only to potato
 
specialists but also to a much broader audience of agricultural
 
researchers and policymakers who are searching for ways to expand food 
production and improve human welfare through more effective national
 
programs.
 
CIP has supported the Korean program in many ways including training,
 
the posting of experts in the country, technical assistance, and a 
continuing dialogue with Korean scientists and policy makers. Neverthe­
less, the success of the Korean Program results primarily from the Korean
 
government's commitment to agricultural research and development.
 
Director General
 
International Potato Center
 
Lima, Peru
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Preface 
At the request of the Rural Development Administration, Ministry of
 
Agriculture, Republic of Korea, a study of Korea's Seed Potato Program was
 
carried out in June 1986. The main initial objective was to assess the 
program's economic costs and benefits. As the study progressed, it became
 
apparent that to understand the program's benefits it was essential to
 
look more broadly at the potato's role in Korea's food system and how the 
availabiiltv of quality 2ed influenced farmers' production decisions, 
potato prices and consumption. It also became clear that seed produced by
 
the "official" qeed Program was being multiplied by an "informal" seed 
system about which relatively little was known.
 
The Initial study was conduL-ced and a report was drafted in a period 
of lust over one month. Mo,;t interviews were carried out in the alpine 
seed producing area and In public offices in Suweon and Seoul. It was not 
possible to visit major lowland potato producing areas to discuss seed 
problems with farmers, traders and public officials in these areas.
 
In early 1Q87 the report, Korea's Seed Potato Program: Organization,
 
Impact and Issues was presented to, and discussed with, officials of the 
Korean government. In May and June, 1q87 additional statistics were 
gathered, interviews were conducted and a brief field visit was made to 
southern provinces where farmers purchase seed from the alpine area. The 
present repnort is a revised, updated and expanded version of the earlier 
publication, which Incorporates the new information and comments obtained 
in 1987.
 
The authors are indebted to many people who took the time to meet 
with us, and who provided information and insights that are presented in 
this report. The authors would specifically like to acknowledge the 
valuable Information provided 'y: I. K. Kim (Head, Horticulture 
Department) and Y. I. Hahm (Junior Agric ultural Research, pathology) o. 
the klpine Experiment Station; M. C. Chung (Director) and D. H. Chung
 
(Senior Agricultural Researcher) of the Kangweon Provincial Registered 
Seed Farm; I. S. Kim (Director) and J. A. Lim (Senior Officer) of the 
Office of Soed Production and Distribution, Daekwalryung Branch; J. Y. 
Kim, President of the Kangneung Horticultural Cooperative Association; W. 
B. Jeon, Seed Specialist of the National Agricultural Products Inspection
 
Office; C. K. Chung, progressive potato farmer in the alpine area; 0. H. 
iv,,, Senior Agricultural Officer(agronomist) ot the Horticultural Experi­
ment Station; I. S. Lee, Chief, Production Department of the Office of 
Seed Production and Distribution.
 
The authors would also like to acknowledge the assistance of Ms. Ok
 
Sun Lee of the Horticultural Experiment Station for gatheting statistics,
 
and of Norma Puican (CIP) for processing the voluminous statistical data
 
and preparing tables and figures. Mariella Altet and Lilia Salinas (CIP)
 
were responsible for word processing. Valuable comments on a draft of the
 
report were provided by J. Bryan, C. Crissman, A. Monares, and G. Scott.
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Summary
 
Potatoes have been grown on the Korean peninsula sinc, at least the
 
early 1800s. Formerly, most potatoes were cultivated during summer in
 
mountainous (alpine) areas, but over time an increasing proportion of the
 
crop has been grown in the lowlands. At present, oniv about one-third of
 
Korea's potatoes are cultivated in alpine areas and two-thlrds are in the
 
lowlands. About half the crop is produced in the spring before vegetal
 
bles and other "upland" (non-irrigated) crops; an additional 10 percent of
 
the crop is grown in spring on paddy land before rice. About 5 percent is
 
planted in the fall after spring vegetables or tobacco and 3 percent is
 
grown in winter on Cheju island, off the southern coast of the peninsula.
 
Most potatoes are h-rvested in the summer in lowland areas where high
 
temperatures and rainfall make storage difficult. Many farmers in alpine
 
area- store potatoes for sale later when prices are high. Lowland farm­
ers would like to expand the fall and winter crops to take advantage of
 
high prices during winter and spring. However, hot, rainv summer weather,
 
early frosts and cold winter temperatures severely limit expansion of
 
potato production in the fall and winter. 
Korea's economy was pcedominantlv agricultural and subsistence­
oriented until quite recettly. Potatct were grown as a staple food in 
the highlands and as a seasonal., garden vegetable throughout the lowlands.
 
Korea's rapid economic growth, integration of the national economy and 
urbanization have all tended to reduce subsistence potato production, both
 
in the highlands and the lowlands. Increasingly, potatoes are grown as a
 
cash crop that supplies large towns and cities. Consumers' perceptions of
 
the potato as a food are mixed. Many older people who had to survive on
 
potatoes and sweet potatoes during World War II are averse to eating them.
 
However, most young people like potatoes, especially when they are served
 
in "Western" fast food reL:P1rants.
 
Trends in potato consumption have been strongly influenced by the
 
supply and price of potatoes. Because of high marketing costs, the shift
 
from subsistence- to market-oriented production has increased the price of
 
potatoes to consumers. During the late 1960s and 1970s, the cost of
 
producing a hectare of potatoes rose because potato growers had to pay
 
increasingly higher wage rates and they used more chemical fertilizers and
 
pesticides. Due to the poor quality of seed, average potato yields re­
mained low -- around 11 t/ha. Consequently, the cost of producing a
 
kilogram of potatoes rose.
 
In the late 1970s potato yields dropped about 40 percent and total
 
production fell by more than half. This sharp reduction in yields and
 
pi. duction resulted from a collapse of Korea's Seed Potato Ce-'tification
 
Program. Established in 1961, this program was based on a rather simple 
and loosely organized technical scheme which did not effectively control 
the spread of diseases. Gradually, the Seed Program's Foundation Seed 
stocks -- the source of farmers' planting material-- became heavily 
infected with yield-reducing virus diseases. 
In response to the virus problem and farmeis' demands for better
 
quality seed, the Korean Governnernt reorganized the Seed Potato Program,
 
establishing a Basic Seed Production scheme that used tissue-culture for
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producing, storing and rapidly multiplying virus-free planting material.
 
Techniques for field multiplication, inspection and pathogen testing of
 
Foundation, Registered and Certified Seed were also improved. Quality
 
checks became much more systematic throughout the system.
 
Major impacts of the re-organized seed program include a sharp re­
duction of virus disease symptoms in fArmers' fields and a spectacular
 
increase in yields -- from an average of 11 t/ha In the 1970s to over 20 
t/ha at present. A conservative estimate is that the seed program in­
creased farmers' incomes by approximately W 17 billion (US$ 20 million) in 
1984. For every won spent, the program generated about W 25 in increased
 
farm incomes. Consumers also benefited from an expanded supply of cheaper
 
potatoes.
 
Surprisingly, only about I. percent of the seed potatoes that farmers 
use each year are certified; the rest comes from an "informal" seed system
 
which runs parallel to the "official" Seed Program without support, super­
vision or access to inspection services. It seems likely that the total 
benefits of the Seed Program could be increased if it were better in­
tegrated with the farmers' Informal seed system.
 
The public sector has played an Important pioneering role in estab­
lishing the Seed Potato Certification Progrnm. However, the managerial 
and technical requirements For producing and Oistributing a large volume 
of 	high-quality seed potatoes are now stretching the capacity of the
 
instiLt,itions involved 'particulac.lv the Provincial Seed Farm, Office of 
Seed Produc ion and Distribution (OSPD) and National Agricultural Products 
Inspection )fflce (NAPIO)). Pcforms on three levels .iiht be considered: 
" 	Transfer responsibilitv for producing and marketing Foundation,
 
Registered and Certified Seed to the private sector
 
" 	 Strengthen technical capacity in the key areas of seed potato 
inspection and certification 
" 	 Clarify the responsibilities of institutions participating in the 
seed program 
It 	is generally believed that subsidies and governm-nt management of
 
the Seed Program are needed to keep down the cost of Certtfied Seed 
potatoes. However, an economic calculation indicates that if the Alpine 
Experiment Station (AES) sold Foundation Seed at W 1,000/kg (nearly its 
cost of production), private growers could profitably sell Registered Seed 
for about W 570/kg and Certified Seed for W 360/kg -. about 10 percent 
below the price that the OSPD now charges farmers for Certified Seed.
 
At present, production of Certified Seed potatoes is one of the most 
profitable farm entreprises in Korea. This is because members of the 
Kangneung Horticultural Cooperative Association (KHCA) have privileged 
access to Registered Seed at a prico that is far below its true economic 
value. Strengthening the operation cf market forces in the seed system, 
by allowing more growers to participate and by charging prices for Founda­
tion and Registered Seed that more nearly approximate their true economic 
values, would reduce some seed grower's earnings, but, more importantly,
 
it would stimulate at-, increase in the total supply of Certified Seed and
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reduce its average price to lowland farmers. An expanded supply of
 
cheaper seed would stimulate production and help reduce the price of table
 
potatoes. This, In turn, would 
lead to increased potato consumption.
 
While the Korean potato program has been outstandingly successful in
 
nroducing high-quality seed for the country's farmers, 
it has done less in
 
other important areas: breeding, post-harvest technology, and on-farm
 
research.
 
Since the program's inception, only one new locally bred potato

variety has been released (Kangweon no. 6) and this variety has not been
 
successful because it Is susceptible to virus diseases. At present, the
 
seed program supplies farmers with certified seed of only three varieties:
 
Irish Cobbler, Superior, and Dejl ima. Given the country's diverse agro­
ecological zones, potato farmers could use many more varieties. 
Importation and local testing of foreign cultivars should be considered as
 
a way to help meet the countrv's short-term needs while new Korean
 
varieties are being developed.
 
The most significant growth area for potatoes Is processing. With
 
its large metropolitan areas, rapid economic progress and burgeoning
 
tourism, Korea presents an attractive potential market for processed
 
potatoes: both potato chips and frozen 
french fries. However, potato
 
processing has been limited by the absence of suitable varieties with high

dry matter and a short grning period. Quick identification of 
appropriate processing varieties will require that more attention be paid 
to breeding, introduction of foreign cultivars, and on-farm variety
 
testing.
 
To ensure a reasonably constant year-round supply of potatoes for
 
seed, direct consumption and processing, storage research and extension
 
are needed to identify and diffuse better ways of keeping potatoes.
 
The mechanisms used to communicate farmers' needs to researchers and
 
to transfer research results back to farmers are complex and time
 
consuming. This two-way communication, and the overall performance of
 
Korea's agricultural R&D system, could be improved by expanding on-farm
 
research and testing.
 
It is concluded that a few changes in potato R&D could generate high
 
returns for the Korean economy and raise the status of the potato from
 
that of a minor vegetable to that of a major food crop in the country's
 
food system. Top priority should be on: expanding the role of the private
 
sector in seed production and distribution, making new varieties available
 
to farmers, improving post-harvest technology and expanding on-farm
 
re 3earch. 
1. Potatoes in the Korean Food System 
With an average per capita gross national product of more than $2,000
 
(Table 1), the Republic of Korea is an "upper middle-Income country"
 
(World Bank, 1986). This is a dramatic change from the situation a
 
generation ago, when Korea was one of the world's poorest countries. Over
 
the last three decades, Korea has registered one of the highest economic
 
growth rates of any country in the world; national product grew at an
 
annual average rate oL about 10% from 1965 to 1973 and 7% from 1973 to
 
1984. The country has rapidly urbanized and industrialized. By 1984, the
 
share of agriculture In gross domestic product had fallen to less than 15
 
percent and the shares of industry and services had reached 40 percent and
 
47 percent, respectively.
 
Agricul tur 1 ,,rowth has kept pace wi th population growth and food 
supplies now ex,,ed domestic caloric requirements by a comfortable margin. 
Nevertheless, Kort- Is heavily dependent on food imports; in 1984 cereal 
imports amounted to over 150 kg per person. An important factor behind 
Korea's food imports is the relative scarcity of cropland. Of the coun­
try's ten million hectareE of land, only about two million hectares are 
arable. Hence, wltn a total population of 40 million, Korea has nearly 20 
inhabitants per hectare of arable land. 
The Korean diet is rice-based. In 1980, roughly half the calories in 
the national diet came from ric-. However, in the quest for economic 
development and self qufficiency in food, Lhe Korean government has begun 
to explores the potential role of food crops like potatoes which, on a 
per-hectare basis, can generate more food and income than rice (Horton,
 
1987, Tables 5 and 6).
 
Table 1. Republic of Korea: Basic Statistics
 
GNP per capita (US$) 2,110 Population per ha arable land
 
- total populatioi 19
 
Population 
- rural population 7 
- total (million) 40 
- rural (%) 36 Fertilizer use (kg/ha) 331 
Growth rates (%) Cereal imports 
- population 1.5 - total (000 t) 6,334 
- GNP per capita 6.6 - per capita (000 t) 158 
- agriculture 1.7 
Daily per capita calorie supply 
Land area (million ha) - total 2,765 
- total 9.8 - % requirement 118 
- arable 2.1 - % from rice 49 
Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1986 (New York, 1986); FAO,
 
Production Yearbook 1986 (Rome, 1987); FAO, Food balance sheets 1979-1981
 
average (Rome, 1984). Note: Estimates of GNP per capita, population and
 
cereal imports are for 1984; fertilizer use and daily calorie supplies are
 
estimates for 1983. The estimated average growth rate of GNP per capita
 
is for the period 1965-84; growth rates of population and agricultural
 
production are for 1973-1984.
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Introduction and Spread of Potatoes I
 
After its introduction to the Korean peninsula, reportedly in 1824,
 
the potato was cultivated first in northern mountainous areas that had a 
relativelv long, cool summer growing season. Gradually, potato cultiva­
tion spread from north to south and from higher to lower areas. In 
addition to the varieties originally introduced from Japan and China, 
others were brought from Europe and the Americas in the nineteenth cen­
19 2 0
 tury. Tn the 
 s, a series of new lines was selected from local
 
varieties. However, one these, known asonlv of 	 Nangok No. 1, became 
widely grown.
 
The old Korean cultivars are generallv late-maturing and fairly
 
tolerant to late blight and virus diseases. The plant type, with tall, 
rather weak vines and small leaves, resembles that of Soianum tuberosum 
subspecies andigenum, th? commonly cultivated potato of the South American
 
highlands. During the last 50 years, varieties with large leaves and 
more 	compact foliage, typical of Solanum tuberosuin subspecies tuberosum,
 
were introduced and spread throughout the Korean peninsula. The older 
Korean cultivar5 are now founl only in a few isolated locations and in 
collections of orean cultivars on experiment stations. 
In the 1930s, tie American variety Irish Cobbler was introduced from 
Hokkaido, Japan. In addition to its excellent culinary quality, it was 
earlier maturing than the older Korean cultivars, allowing farmers in many 
lowland areas to harvest a potato crop In the spring before rice or other 
crops needed to be planted. Farmers were encouraged by government organi­
zations to produce Irish Cobbler, and it quickly become the leading potato 
variety in the Republic of Korea. One disadvantage of the Irish Cobbler
 
variety was its susceptibility to virus diseases, which made it necessary
 
to have a regular supply of healthy seed.
 
Since 1970, many foreign varieties have been introduced and a
 
breeding program has been established. Two Japanese cultivars, Shimabara
 
and Dejima, are now grown in the fall after vegetables and other upland 
crops. The American cultivar, Superior, is gaining popularity in the
 
spring crop. A major advantage of Superior over Irish Cobbler is its 
greater field resistance to viruses. Recent 
interest in establishing
 
"fast-food" restaurants has to intensive search for thatled an 	 varieties 
are suitable for making french fries (oblong shape and high dry matter) 
and which yield well under Korean conditions. To date, no specialized
 
processing varieties 
have been released and Irish Cobbler, Superior, and
 
Dejima remain Korea's principal potato varieties.
 
Production Zones and Systems
 
From the cool, northern hilly areas, the potato spread southward and
 
to lower elevations, becoming one of the most common 
garden vegetables.
 
Potatoes are grown throughout the country by as many as 90% of the farm
 
families, a
in small garden plots, measuring less than one-tenth of 

hectare (MAF, 1980).
 
1 	 This and the following two sections draw heavily on Fr..nkowiak (1978)
 
and Anonymous (1982).
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Potatoes are encountered in five distinct cropping systems in the
 
Republic of Korea (Table 2):
 
" Spring crop in rainfed, upland areas
 
* Spring crop in irrigated paddy fields
 
" Summer crop in highland (alpine) areas
 
" Fall upland crop
 
" Winter crop in Cheju island
 
Table 2. Characteristics of 	main potato cropping systems
 
Area Yield Cropping Growing season Principal
 
(000 ha) (t/ha) sequence months days location
 
Spring crop
 
- Upland 18 16 Before Apr-July 90-110 Hillsides
 
vegetables throughout
 
country
 
- Paddy 4 15 	 Before Mar-June 70-90 Sandy river
 
rice valleys
 
Summer crop 6 29 	 Full May-Sept 120-140 Northeastern
 
season highlands
 
Fall crop 2 13 	 After Aug-Nov 80-100 Southern
 
vegetables hillsides
 
or tobacco
 
Winter crop 1 16 	 After Dec-April 110-130 Cheju
 
vegetables
 
or rice
 
Source: Based on Anonymous (1982) and Kim et al (1986). See also Table A
 
1.2. Note: This table and all following tables present data for the
 
Republic of Korea.
 
Over half of Korea's potatoes are cultivated in springtime in small
 
upland fields and gardens, some of which can be observed in and around
 
small towns and villages. This pattern was much more common in the past,
 
when the Korean food system was more highly dependent on household produc­
tion. Spring potatoes are generally planted in March or April and
 
harvested in late June and July (Figure 1). Planting and harvest dates
 
are earlier in southern parts of the peninsula than in the north. In
 
small fields and gardens, potatoes are often intercropped with beans,
 
corn, and a variety of summer 'vegetables. In larger fields, potatoes are
 
more commonly grown as a sole crop. After the potato harvest, cool-season
 
vegetables like Chinese cabbage and Korean radish are generaly planted.
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Figure 1. Metereological data and potato calendar 
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Between 10 percent and 15 percent of the potato crop is planted in 
February and March in p xddy fields, generally on -iver bottom land with 
sandy soils and good drainage. Farmers must harvest this crop by June in 
ordec to plc.nt rice. Because of the risk of frost In early sprin3, nosc 
of the spring paddy crop is planted in the southern parts of the country. 
In the north, in order to take advantu,.ge of high market prices, some 
farmers close to Urban markets plant tubers in sand beds in greenhouses 
during late winter and transplant rooted seedpieces to the field as early
 
as weather permits.
 
About 20 percent of Korea's potato crop is gro-n in alpine areas in 
the northeast. This is a full-season crop generally planted in Ma- and
 
harvested in September. Sole croppiig is the norm and fields are compara­
tively large, averaging from 0.2 ha to 1.5 ha.
 
The fall and winter crops are small but strategic components n the 
Korean potato economy, supplying fresh potatoes to urban markets in winter 
and spring when market prices are at their highest levels. The fall crop 
---around 5 percent oF the total- is mostly grown in upland fields in the 
south. Planting is in August after spring vegetables or maize; harvesting 
is in November and December. Being a commercial enterprise, the fall 
potatoes are generally planted in relatively large fields as a sole crop. 
The wint, - crop, planted in January and harvested in April and May, 
accounts for less than 3 percent of the total. It is restricted to Cheju 
island, off the southern tip of the Korean peninsula, where benign climate
 
permits potato cultivation throughout the winter. 
Potato yields are highest in the alpine area for several reasonp.
 
Seed quality is generally better than in lowland areas because storage
 
conditions are better and tLhe incidence of virus diseases is lower.
 
Alpine farmers also benefit fiom a longer growing seasons with more 
favorable (cooler, moist) growing conditions. Spring crop yields are 
constrained by the short available growing season. Fall crop yields are 
low because it is hot and rainy at planting time, and if planting is 
delayed frost can destroy the crop before harvest.
 
In the near future, significant expansion of the fall and winter 
crops seems unlikely. The fall crop is limited by high temperature and 
rainfall at planting time. The winter crop is limited by high production 
and marketing costs. 
Potatoes in the Diet
 
Until quite recently, Korea's economy was largely subsistence­
oriented and most potatoes were consumed by the households that produced 
them. In the northeastern highlands, maize and potatoes were major staple 
food crops. Cold winter weather aftrr the harvest allowed households to 
store their own potatoes for consupion nearly year round. In the rest 
of the country, rice was the major staple food and potatoes were consumed 
as a side dish. In lowland areas, rainy summer weather and high tempera­
tures made It difficult to store spring-crop potatoes for later consump­
tion. Consequently, the potato played the role of a seasonal vegetable.
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During the last generation, Korea's rapid urbanization and economic 
growth hav- brkn the traditional link between food production and con­
sumption. Rising incomes and improved transportation and marketing have
 
allrwed households in both rural and urban areas to diversify tfeir diets. 
In alpine areas, rice has becone more available and maize and potato
 
consumption has fallen. 7n 
lowland towns and cities, potato productiou in
 
household gardens has 
declined and shipments of potatoes from specialized
 
commercial producing areas have increased.
 
During the Japanese occupation of Korea and the Second World War, 
rice became scarce and many people found tt necessary to eat potatoes and
 
sweet potatoes in order to survive. This experience created a stigma
 
against root crops among survivors of the war. For this reason, consumer 
surveys indicate that young people have a more positive attitude toward 
potato consumption than their parents (Chu, Lee and lahn, 198'!). 
In homes and :estaurants potatoes may he either boiled or fried and 
served hot or cold. 1'i2y are oftea served in soups or mixed with vegeta­
bles or seafood. French fries and baked potatoes are served in the coun­
try's western-style restaurants. In anticipatlon of the 1988 Olympic 
Games in Seoul, a number of fast food chains are opening restaurants in 
Korea and demand for their meals is 
strong. A major problem encountered
 
by these food chains is that local potatoes are expensive and not well 
suited for making frozen french fries. 
Trends in Production and Consumption
 
Potatoes are grown in all of Korea's rural districts (Figure 2).

Major concentrations are in Kangweon province in the northeast and
 
Fyongbuk, and Kyougnam in the southeast and southern 
part of the
 
peninsula. In Chonnam, the area seeded early spring potatoes
to has
 
expanded rapidlv in recent years (Figure 2 and Table A 1.3). 
After reaching a maximum level in 1966, Korea's potato production 
oscillated from 450,000 t to 150,000 t for the next decade and then 
declined precipitously to 30A,000 t in 1978 -the lowest level in 25 years 
(Figure 3). Per capita potato consumption, which was 16 kg in 1965, fell 
to just over 5 kg in 1979 (Chu, Lee and Hahn, 1982). 
The drop in potato production and consumption in the 1970s is usually

explained in terms of rising incomes and declining demand for root 
 crops 
(Chu, Lee and Hahn, 1982). According to this explanation, as the Korean 
=conomy developed and average income levels increased, people shifted 
their eating habits away from low-cost, "inferior" root crops, maize, and 
barley, toward the preferred staple, rice, and higher quality foods like 
meat, fish, fruits, and vegetables.
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Figure 2. Map showing d;tribution of area seeded to potatoes, 1980 (each dot (0) repre­
sents 100 	ha). Data provided by Republic of Korea, Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries. 
...~ . 4.:.i. 
 
Provinces 000 ha 
1.Seoul -	 ." "•
 
2. Pusan 0.2 	 . . 
3. Kyonggi 2.3 	 5. 
4. Kangweon 10.1 	 " .. . 
5. Chungbuk 2.7 
6. Chungnam 2.9 " 	 9 
7. Chonbuk 2.8-." 	 ­
8. Chonnam 3.3 
9. Kyongbuk 6.2 
10. Kyongnam 5.7 	 . .'.7 . 
11. 	 Cheju 1.1 . . .. , 
Total 37.4 10 
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Figure 3. Potato production, area, yield, and real producer prices 1961-85 
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Source: Tables A 1.1 and A 4.1. 
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This argument ignores several important facts:
 
" Potatoes are relatively high in nutritional quality, 
" Potatoes are relatively expensive in Korea
 
" Potato consumption is highest among rich people
 
" Urbanization has made potatoes more expensive
 
• Imports of potato starch have increased in recent years
 
" Production costs for potatoes have risen 
" Potato prices rose sharply as production declined in the late 1970s
 
" rhe seed system collapsed in tha late 1970s
 
Many people think of the potato primarily as a source of starch.
 
However, potatoes have relatively high-quality protein, a high protein-to­
energy ratio, and they provide valuable amino acids and minerals (Woolfe,
 
1987).
 
Per unit of dietary energy and protein, potatoes are relatively
 
expensive in Korea (Table 3). For this reason, rich people consume more
 
potatoes than poor people do. Hence, economic growth and rising income
 
levels can be expected to result in higher, rather than lower, levels of 
potato consumption (Horton, 1987, chapter 4).
 
Table 3. Cost of food nutrients from various foods 1984
 
Price Edible Food composition Price per unit
 
per kg. portion energy protein energy protein
 
(W) (%) (Kcal/kg) (g/kg) (W/lOOKcal) (W/g)
 
Rice a/ 809 100 3,630 67 223 12
 
Bread b/ 768 100 2,750 90 279 

Potato 453 81 760 21 736 26
 
Source: Anonymous. Results of the ILO 1984 October Inquiry. ILO Bulletin 
of Labour Statistics. 1985-2 and USDA. Composition of Foods 
(Washington,D.C., 1975). a/ White, polished unenriched. b/ White, 
unenriched.
 
Since 1960, the Republic of Korea has evolved from an essentially 
rural country to one in which about three-quarters of the population 
resides in urban areas. The massive shift of population from rural to 
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8 
urban areas brought about a reduction in the number of potatoes produced 
for home consurption in rural and village gardens, and it has increased 
marketing cosCs. The marketing margin for potatoes -- about 50 percent -­
represents a higher share of the consumer price than it does for most 
other Korean foods (Chu, Lee and Hahn, 1982). 
From 1983 to 1986 imports cf potato starch from Holland increased
 
from 5,000 t to o'er 7,000 t. 1his starch, used mostly to manufacture 
noodles, represents the equivalent of about 100,000 t of fresh potatoes.
 
This large-scale importation has certainly dampened the market for locally
 
produced potatoes.
 
Finally, and of most direct relevance to agricultural research and 
extension, unit production costs for potatoes increased in the 1970s. 
This was partly becau, increa.1ing rural wages made labor-intensive crops 
like potatoes relatively expensive to produce. Additionally, farmers 
began using more purchased inputs, like chemical fertilizers and 
pesticides. Nevertheless, potato yields remained low because quality seed 
tubers were not available. Tn fact, seed potatoes became so heavilv 
infected with virus diseases that vields suddenly dropped by 40 percent 
between 1975 and 1978 (Figure 3). As a result of !ncreased production 
costs and reduced yields, potato prices slkyrocketed and both piaduction 
and consumption declined significantlv. 
For the reasons just outlined, it seems clear that the principal 
reason why potato production and consumption levels fell in the 1970s was 
not that demand contracted but that costs rose and supply contracted.
 
Since 1980, as Korea's seed problem has been brought under control, potato
 
production and per capita consumption have increased to previous levels
 
and the relative price of potatoes has declined.
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2. Early Attemps at Seed Potato Certification 
Most potato farmers the wcrld over grow potato crops from tubers 
rather than seed per se. The cost, physiological condition and health of
 
seed tubers influence potato production systems in many ways.
 
Seed tubers are usually the most costly single input in potato pro­
duction. Data on Korea's main foodcrops show that the potato has one of 
the highest seed costs, and, as a result, one of the highest total produc­
tion costs per hectare (Table 4). The high production cost introduces a 
risk factor which discourages many growers from specializing in potato 
cultiNvation.
 
Table 4. 	 Production cost and seed cost per hectare for major crops 1985 
(000 w) 
Prodn cost Seed cost 
Prodn Seed less seed as % of 
cost cost cost prodn cost 
Rice 1,139 34 1,105 3 
Naked barley 556 51 505 9 
Maize 851 37 814 4 
Soybean 547 50 497 9 
Potato:
 
- spring 1,638 623 1,015 38 
- fall 1,525 657 878 43 
Sweet potato 904 169 735 19 
Raddish, fall 1,040 183 857 18 
Chiiese cabbage,fall 1,225 106 1,119 9 
Garlic 6,065 4,540 1,525 75 
Hot pepper 2,103 315 1,788 15 
Tomato 2,638 403 2,235 15 
Source: RDA. 1986. Major indicators of Korean agriculture. Farm Managment
 
Division Series No. 41 (Suweon), and RDA. 1986. Standard income analysis
 
for agricultutal products 1985. Suweon.
 
After harvest, tubers pass through a series of physiological stages 
that influence the development and yield of the subsequent crop. These are
 
generally referred to as dormancy, single-sprout development (or apical
 
dominance), multiple sprout development, and senility. To achieve high
 
yields, farmers should generally plant seed tubers in the multiple sprout
 
stage. Because of the relatively long dormancy period of Irish Cobbler,
 
farmers in southern parts of the Korean peninsula cannot use tubers
 
harvested from the spring crop as planting material in the fall. If
 
planted, this seed would produced an uneven, late-emerging, late-maturing,
 
low-yielding crop. For this reason, farmers plant DeJima and Shimabara, 
which have shorter dormancy periods. 
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A third major drawback of vegetative reproduction is that many yield­
reducing diseases and pests -- most importantly viruses, but also 
bacteria, fungi, and nematodes -- can be spread by seed tubers. 
Various types of seed systems have been devised by farmers and 
go'rernment agencies to minimize the spread of pests and diseases through 
seed tubers and to provide growers with reasonably priced seed in good 
physiological condition for planting. Most prelalent are "informal seed 
systems" developed over time by farmers and prliate merchants. Since seed
 
tubers produced in cool areas are generally better than those from warm 
areas, farmers in low areas where diseases are prevalent and seed storage 
is difficult often buy seed tubers from mountainous areas. Farmers in 
northern hemisphere temperate areas generally buy seed tubers from farmers
 
farther north. In temperate- ,ireas in the southern hemisphere, seed gen­
erally flows from south to north. 
Most developed countries have established "official" Seed Potato 
Certification Programs to provide Farmers with a trustworthy supply of 
planting material. Many developing countries, 'including the Republic of 
Korea, have attempted to establish similar programs, with varying degrees
 
of success. 
Due to complexity of the Repiblic of Korea's potato production sys­
tems, with different planting dates and growing periods in different parts
 
of the country nnd production ranging from garden plots for home consump­
tion to commerciallY-oriented farms, the country's seed potato systems are 
also complex. 
Korea's Traditional Seed System
 
Before the Korean War, farmers in southern parts of the peninsula 
used seed potatoes that were produced in northern mountainous areas. The 
political separation of Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the 
Republic of Korea made it necessary to develop autonomous seed systems in 
the south. Private merchants occasionally imported seed potatoes from 
Japan, but this was discouraged by the government. Within the Republic of
 
Korea, the alpine areas in Kangweon province emerged as the favored source
 
of seed potatoes. Some seed was also produced In mountainous areas of 
Kvongbuk and Kyongnam provinces. Commercial farmers in the lowlands
 
usually purchased highland seed, but many subsistence growers kept a few 
19 5 0 tubers from each harvest to plant the next crop. In the s, most 
potato fields were severely infected with virus diseases, and black leg, a 
bacterial disease caused b Erwinia spp. was widespread in paddy areas. 
Yields averaged only about 7 t/ha (Frankowlak, 1978). 
The Seed Certification .P'oram 
In 1961, Korea began seed certification for the basic food crops, 
including potatoes. The initial priority for potatoes was to ensure an 
adequate supply of quality planting material for the spring crop in the 
lowlands. The Alpine Experiment Station (AES) in the northeastern high­
lands, at Taekwanryong in Kangweon Province, was made responsible for 
producing the highest grades of seed potatoes -- Elite and Foundation Seed 
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-- for the spring crops. Foundation seed was then multiplied once by 
private seed growers before being distributed as Certified Seed in lowland 
areas. In 1966 AES also began producing Elite and Foundation Seed for the 
fall crop. In this case, Foundation Seed was delivered directly to table 
potato producers with no further multiplication (Tables A 2.1 and A 2.2). 
There was no official Seed Certification Program for the summer
 
(alpine) crop or the winter crop in Cheju island. Alpine farmers usually
 
kept their own seed or bought non-certified seed from local seed growers.
 
There was no adequate seed supply for Cheju island, however, until the
 
government established a special Seed Program in the 1970s.
 
Technical scheme. The technical scheme for producing Certified Seed
 
was relatively simple. There were no systematic laboratory tests for
 
virus diseases. Little was known about potato viruses in Korea at the
 
time, and practical methods for laboratory detection of important ones,
 
like potato leaf roll virus (PLRV), were not available. On the assumption
 
that potato viruses X and S (PVX and PVS) were of little practical
 
importace, no organized attempt was made to detect or eliminate them.
 
Seed inspection was based on visual detection of virus symptoms in the
 
field. Field inspection was deficient because most inspectors had little
 
knowledge of potato viruses. Moreover, only a small number of seed potato
 
fields were actually inspected.
 
Until 1969, seed for the spring 'rop was multiplied twice on AES and
 
once bv private Certified Seed growers (Table A 2.1). In 1969/70, two
 
additional multiplications were added to the system, one at AES and
 
second at the newly established Kangweon Provincial Seed Farm (PSF).
 
Hence, during the 1970s, the Seed Potato Program involved five stages:
 
production of Elite I, Elite TI, and Foundation Seed on AES; production of
 
Registered Seed on the PSF; and production of Certified Seed by private
 
growers. All multiplications were carried out in the field until 1980,
 
when net houses were erected for production of the Elite I generation.
 
From 1969 until 1978 AES alsa produced Elite I and Elite II Seed for
 
the fall crop. Foundation and Registered Seed were produced at Cheju
 
Experi _ent Station, and the Kimhae Horticultural Cooperative Association
 
(Kyongnam province) produced Certified Seed.
 
Institutional scheme. In contrast t,, the Seed Program's relatively
 
simple technical scheme, the institutional scheme was complex. Nine
 
institutions were directly involved. Many with overlapping
 
responsibi lities:
 
" 	 Alpine Experiment Station (AES) was responsible for producing 
Elite I, Elite tI, and Foundation seed. 
" 	 Kangweon Provincial Seed Farm (PSF) was responsible for producing 
Registered Seed. 
" 	 Office of Seed Production and Distribution (OSPD) was responsible 
for supervising production and distribution of Certified Seed. Both 
the local Daekwalryun- Branch and the national headquarters offices 
were involved. 
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" 	Kangneung Horticultural Cooperative Association (KHCA) organized
 
production of Certified Seed on its members' farms.
 
" 	 National Apricultural Cooperative Federation (NACF) handled 
distribution of the seed through its national-wide distribution 
sys tem. 
Ministry (f Aiculture and Fisheries (MAF) through the govern­
mental administrative organization at the village, municipal, county,
 
province, and national levels, chinneled requests for seed to the
 
KHCA and set production targets and prices for all grades of seed.
 
* 	National ALricultural Products nspecton Office (NAPIO) was respon­
sible for inspecting aid certifying seed. 
" 	 The Division of Plant Pathology of the Institute of Agricultural 
Science took part in the inspection of Elite and Foundation Seed. 
" 	The MAF's Office of PIl-t Quarantine participated in inspection of 
Registered and Certified Seed. 
Each year, lowland farmers who wished to obtain Certified Seed for 
the sprina crop placed orders with district (mvon) government offices 
(Figure 4). These orders were channeled tip thirough the county (g), and 
provincial offices to the national level, where they were communicated to 
the national headquarters of the OSPD. This information was, in turn, 
directed to OSPD's Daekwalryung Branch Office and the KHCA. Once the seed 
was produced by members of the M-ICA, it was processed and stored in OSPD 
facilities and then distributed through NACF channels. The whole procers 
could take over a year. 
The MAF established production quotas and price levels for each grade 
of 	seed. In order to avoid seed surpluses in years with low potato
 
prices, the MAF set quite conservative production goals for Certified 
Seed. As a result, in most years Certified Seed was in short supply and 
needed to be rationed among potential lowland buyers.
 
Trends in Certified Seed Production
 
The initial strategy was to produce Certified Seed on a large number 
of small fields (Figure 5). From 1965 until 1974, aa average of 4,600
 
seed potato fields were inspected each year. Over this period, the
 
average size of field increased gradually from 0.16 ha to 0.34 ha and the
 
yield of Certified Seed rose from just over 3 t/ha to 7 t/ha. As a result 
of these trends the total production of Certified Seed potatoes rose from 
2,700 t in 1965 to 9,800 t in 1973 (Table A 2.7). After 1974, the produc­
tion of Certified Seed fell precipitously to a minimum of 650 tons in 
1979. In essence, the Program collapsed. 
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Figure 4. Official and informal distribution systems for seed potatoes
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Collapse of the Program: Causes and Results
 
The Seed Program's collapse was brought on by a "crisis of confi­
dence" in seed quality and a drop in farmer demand for Certified Seed. 
This resulted from the massive build up of virus diseases in seed stock. 
Yields of Irish Cobbler are strongly influenced by seeC-borne virus di­
seases, and the Korean Seed Program's rather elemental and unsystematic 
approach to detection and elimination of diseased plants was not effective
 
in controlling the spread of virus diseases. The program's collapse was 
precipitated by two seasons of unusually warm, dry weather in the alpine 
area, which led to increasing populations of virus-transmitting aphids.
 
Alpine seed became severely infected with viruses (Annex 3). As a result,
 
its yielding capacity declined and farmers stopped buying Certified Seed.
 
Seed quality became so bad that in only three years -- from 1975 to 
1978 -- average national yields dropped from 12.8 t/ha to 7.8 t/ha. Net 
returns to potato production dropped sha ply and farmers reduced potato 
plantings. Total potato production fell by more than half, from 660,000 t 
to 304,000 t. Farmers complained shout the poor seed quality of Certified 
Seed at all levels of the government up to the president's office. 
In order to re,:over from the dlebacle as quilckly as possible, the 
government authorized nportation of a few hundred tons of seed from Japan 
in 1980, 1981 and 1192. This seed was multiplied once or twice and 
distributed as Certified Seed. Of far greater importance, the crisis of 
Lhe late 1970s led to a reorganization and strengthening of the Seed 
Certification Program which put Korea's entire potato industry on a more 
solid technical footing.
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3. The New Seed Program 
Beginning in 1979, a new system was established for producing healthy
 
seed, based on systematic virus testing and In-vitro techniques for
 
isolating, storing, and rapidly multiplying virus-free plant materials.
 
AES has maintained responsibility for producing seed for the spring crop. 
The Horticultural Expe.iment Station (HES) has assumed responsibility for
 
producing Elite and Foundation Seed for the fall and winter seasons. In­
vitro stages have been added to the systems both at AES and HES to produce
 
virus-free "Basic Seed." The first three sections describe major aspects 
of the Seed Program established for the spring crop. The fourth section
 
outlines some special features of the Seed Programs for the fall and 
winter crops.
 
In-vitro Stages
 
The new seed system uses shoot tip culture to introduce potato
 
tissue (tubers or other plant parts) into the in-vitro, or heterotropic,
 
state and to eliminate bacteria, f,.igi, and nematodes (Stage I in Figure 
6). Multiple shoot culture is then used to quickly increase the amount of
 
in-vitro material (Stage 2). The shoots produced are subjected to a heat 
treatment (3 0 C for 42 days) to increase the growth rate of meristems and 
to depress the rate of movement of viruses (particularly PVX, PVS, 2VY, 
and PLRV) to the growing tip (Stage 3). Of 100 shoots treated, usually 
only five or ten survive this stage. Meristem apex culture is used to 
excise virus-free cells (Stage 4). Later these will be used to regenerate
 
entire virus-free plants. Meristems that survive both ;he heat treatment 
and meristem apex culture (usually no more than one or two) proceed to
 
Stage 5, in which multiple shoot culture is again used to quickly multiply
 
them. From one to three in-vitro generations are multiplied in glass
 
houses. During this period, the identitv of each clone is recorded
 
separately. If any virus is detected, the multiplied in-vitro shoots are
 
recycled back to Stage 2 or discarded. The optional Stages 6, 7, and 8 
are 
for in-vitro storage of virus-free tuberlets. This allows future seed 
production to begin at Stage 8 avoiding the preceeding shoot-tip culture, 
heat treatment, and meristem apex culture.
 
In multiple shoot culture (Stages 2 and 5), from 10 to 40 cuttings 
can be taken from each shoot each month. Assuming an average of 20
 
cuttings per shoot per month, 8,000 new plants can be produced from one 
shoot in three months, and over five million can be produced in five
 
months. 
In the last in-vitro stage in the system, about 200 cuttings (the
 
number that were actually produced in 1985) are rooted in test tubes
 
(Stage 9).
 
Basic, Elite and Foundation Seed
 
The rooted cuttings are transplanted from test tubes to pots and
 
grown as "mother plants" in greenhouses where extreme precautions are
 
taken to prevent the recontamination of plants with viruses (Stage 10). 
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Figure 6. Technical stages in Korea's Seed Potato Certification Program 
for spring crop 
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Each mother plant is tested for virus diseases, and if any viruses are 
found, the plant is discarded. About 10 cuttings are taken from each 
mother plant and the resulting 2,000 plants are grown in pots in a glass­
house (Stage 11). Again, each plant is tested for viruses. About 3,000 
tubers are harvested from these plants and multiplied in pots in a net­
house (Stage 12). Each pla~nt is tested for vir:s diseases, as is one 
tuber produced by each plant. The tubers harrested at Stage 12 of the 
system (about 2,000 kg) is termed "Basic Seed. This seed is multiplied 
in nethouses to produce about 14 t of "Elite Seed" (Stage 13). Again, 
each plant and one tuber per plant ar, tested for virus diseases. The 
Elite Seed is multiplied in fields on the AES to produce about 120 tons of 
"Foundation Seed" (Stage 14). Insecticides are applied weekly to control 
insects that spread viruses. Foundation Seed fields are checked by a 
committee of seed inspectors three times during the growing season for 
visual symptoms of virus diseases. Before these inspections, personnel of 
AES walk the fields and eliminate all pants suspected of having viru"es. 
Five percent of the tubers produced are also subjected to a "winter test" 
for viruses at the Horticultural Experiment Station in Suweon.
 
In summary, plants or tubers are routinely tested for virus diseases
 
at nine different points in the system before Foundation Seed leaves AES.
 
Such extreme care in controlling virus infection is needed because virus­
transmitting aphids are common in Korea's alpine area and the cultivar
 
ILish Cobbler is susceptible to virus infection.
 
Regfetered and Certified Seed
 
As was the case prior to 1980, Foundation Seed is multiplied by the
 
PSF to produce Registered Seed, wh 'h is then muliplied by private
 
growers, under the supervision of OSPD to produce certified seed. NAPIO
 
is responsible for field inspections and the HES, Suweon, tests a sample
 
of the harvested tubers for virus diseases 3uring the winter season.
 
A number of measures have been taken to reduce the spread of viruses
 
in Registered and Certified Seed Fields (Stages 15 and 16). The PSF has 
reduced the area on which it multiplies Registered Seed and has improved 
management. Several staff members of the PSF, OSPD, and NAPIO have been 
trained in practical aspects of seed potato production and pathology. 
Whereas Registered and Certified Seed fields used to be inspected once 
each season, they are now inspected three times. Furthermore, all seed 
fields are now inspected, witereas previously they were sampled. About 20 
percent of the plants in seed field are now observed for visual symptoms 
of virus diseases, compared to less than 5 percent in the past.
 
Seed Certification for the Fall and Winter Crops
 
Tissue culture research began at HES in 1975 and work on meristem tip 
culture began in 1978. In 1979 these techniques were put to practical use 
in the new Seed Certification Program in which IES was made reponsible for 
producing Basic, Elite, and Foundation Seed for the fall season. Basic 
Seed produced in nethouses by HES in Suweon from in-vitro plantlets is 
shipper! south to HES Nemhae Branch Station in Kyongnam Province (Table 5). 
Elite and Foundation Seed are produced in the Experiment Station's fields 
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in Namhae. Foundation S-:.d is then turned over to OSPD, which produces
Registered and Certified Seed under contract with farmersprivate in the 
area.
 
Prodt, ion of Certified Seed for the winter crop began in 1983. In 
order to provide Cheju growers with seed in optimal physiological condi­
tion at planting time in December, OSPD sends Registered Seed to the
 
alpine area to be multiplied in the summer season.
 
Dejima is the dominant variety grown in the fall and winter seasons, 
because its short period of dormancy - about 60 days compared to 120 days
for Irish Cobbler and Superior -- allows potatoes harvested in spring to 
be planted in the fall (and vice versa) and potatoes harvested in summer 
in the alpine area to be planted in Cheju for the winter crop. 
Table 5. Characteristics of the Seed Program for 
the fall and winter
 
crops
 
Seed Institution Production Product'on Quantity
 
grade responsible site period 1986
 
Basic fiES Suweon All year 480 kg
 
Elite HES Namhae Fall 5 t
 
Foundation HES Namhae Spring 
 36 t
 
Registered OSPD Namhae/Muan Fall 260 t
 
Certified
 
- Fall crop OSPD Milyang Spring 250 t
 
- Winter crop OSPO Alpine area Summer 800 t 
Source: Compiled on the basis of interviews.
 
32
 
4. Official and Informal Systems 
Seed production figures reported by different agencies do not coin­
cide exactly (Annex 2), but certain trends are clear . After the problems 
of the late 197 0 s, AES quickly increased production of Foundation Seed to 
about 175 t in 1982 and then began to gradually reduce production. The
 
PSF increased production of Registered Seed to about 1,100 t and then also
 
began to reduce production. Private growers in the alpine areas increased
 
productior of Certified Seed to about 5,000 t per year and maintained it
 
at that level. NAPIO reports that in 1985, about 6,000 t of seed potatc-3 
were certified nationally, of which, 5,000 t were for the spring and 
summer crops, 250 t were for the fall crop and 650 t were for the winter 
crop. 
Use of Certified Seed in the spring and fall crops has fluctuated
 
from year to year, largely in response to price movements for table
 
potatoes. In contrast, use of Certified Seed in the winter crops has
 
Increased each year since production began in 1983.
 
The Official Seed Certification Program
 
In ]985, Korean farmers planted about 31,000 ha of potatoes, using 
38,000 t of seed tubers (Table 6). Most of the seed for the spring and 
fall crops and around half of that for the alpine crop is purchased. 
9ence, approximately 27,000 t of seed tubers were purchased in 1985. In 
1984, about 6,000 t of Certified Seed were produced (Table A 2,7), 
representing 16 percerit of the total seed requirement and 22 percent of 
the amount of seed that farmers bought in 1985. In other words, the
 
Republic of Korea's official Seed Program supplies less than one-fifth of
 
the seed potatoes planted. The remainder is supplied by a much larger
 
"informal" sced system (Figure 7).
 
Why is so little Certified Seed produced? One reason is that yields 
on seed farms are low. Fields of Foundation, Registered, and Certified 
Seed are reported to yield only 5 to 10 t/ha (Table A 2.1), whereas 
average yields in the alpine region are over 25 t/ha. The reported yields
 
on seed farms are deceptive, however, because they do not reflect total
 
production but only the amount of seed that was passed on to the next
 
stage in the system. Total yields average about 20 t/ha on AES, the PSF,
 
and Certified Seed growers' fields (Tables 11, A 2.3, A 2.4, A 2.6)." The 
large gap between total yields and the amount of seed flowing through the
 
formal seed system reflects substantial "leakages" or "escapes" of high­
quality seed out of the system. These leakages result from the conserva­
tive production quotas and fixed prices that are set for each category of
 
seed.
 
The Seed Program has built-in incentives for the AES, PSF, and KHCA
 
to produce more seed than is needed to meet the production quotas and to
 
sell the surplus to the private growers who operate in the informal seed 
system. AES Is required to deliver a set amount of Foundation Seed to the 
PSF free of charge. The PSF, in turn, must deliver a specified quantity 
of Registered Seed to OSPD at W 214/kg - well below the market price for 
common seed in the region. 
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Table 6. National seed potato requirements
 
Seed Seed Purcha3ed seed
 
Season Area rate reqmt 
 o 000
 
(000 ha) (t/ha) (000 t) reqmt ton
 
Spring 22 
 1.2 o.4 75 19.8 
Summer 6 1.3 7.1 al 50 3.5
 
Fall 2 1.5 
 3.0 75 2.2
 
Winter 1 1.5 1.5 
 75 1.1
 
rotal 
 31 1.2 38.0 
 70 26.7
 
Source: Area: official estimate of the MAF; seed rate and percent

seed purchased: Chu, Lee and Hahn (1982) estimates of the Farm 
Management )ivision, RDA, and personal observations. a/ Approxi­
mately 550 ha of the summer (alpine) crop are in the Seed Program
(460 ha are tised for producing certified seed, 80 are used for 
producing Registered Seed, and 10 ha are used for producing Founda­
tion Seed). Hence, the total seed renuirement for -notato farms out­
side of the Seed Program is 7,085 t (5,450 hia x 1.3 t/ha). 
Figure 7. Sources of farmers' seed potatoes. 
Official seed 
Informal seed system program 
. . .. . . . . . . . .,....,,... . ~~.. . . . .. . . .. . . . . , . .. . . . . . . . I.... . . . . .... .
 
...... i.......... ... 
 .. .
 
... .000 t 
... .. .... . 
Own seed Purchased seed 
Own Common Certified 
Source: Table 5 and A 2.7. 
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The MAF sets low prices for Foundation and Registered Seed to sub­
sildize seed production and ensure that an adequate amount of Certified 
Seed is produced. On the other hand, the MAF sets conservative production 
targets for each seed category to ensure that all the Certified Seed 
produced is sold at its pre-determined fixed price, even in years when the 
market price for common seed is unusually Inw. 
The major "leakage" of quality seed is from the PSF, which has an 
economic incentive to maximize returns bv sell insg as much seed as possible 
to private farmers who offer higher prices than OSPD pays. Because
 
Certified Seed orowers obtain Registered Seed from PSF at an artificially
 
iov price, they too are motivated to produce more potatoes than is re­
quired to meet their quota for Certified Seed and to sell the surplus as
 
high-quality non-certified seed.
 
Adding to these leakan.es of RbYistered and Certified Seed, from 1979 
to 1984 AES bypassed the PCF and :ald substantial amounts of Foundation 
Seed directly to the OSP)D and to the KHCA in order to accelerate the 
diffusion of clean seed in the alpine area. 
It is for these institutional reasons. not technical ones, that
 
Korea's Seed Program produces only a smill share of the country's total
 
seed requirement.
 
The :nforma± Seed System
 
Farmers in the alpine area are among the principal beneficiaries of
 
Korea's 3eed Potato Program. In 1984, they purchase.. about 1,200 t of
 
Certified Seed and more than 2,000 t of Foundation-, Registered- and
 
Certified-qality seed from AES, the PSF and private Certified Seed
 
growers (Table 7). This large infusion of quqlity seed is an important
 
reason why yields in the alpine area are well above the national average.
 
While most alpine farmers scl]. their harvest as table potatoes, a select
 
group of relatively large, experienced farmers produce seed in an
 
"informal" seed system that operates outside of the official seed program.
 
Each year they purchase high-quality seed potatoes which they multiply and
 
sell to lowland farmers as non-certified seed. Since these producers
 
obtain their seed from the AES, PSF, or members of the KHCA, the informal
 
seed system is, in effect, an extension of the Official Seed Ptogram.
 
The Official Seed Program and the informal seed system are
 
complementary in several respects. For lowland farmers, obtaining seed
 
from the Official Seed Program is generally less risky but more burdensome
 
than purchasing seed from the informal system. Certified Seed is sold
 
nationwide at a fixed price which is generally higher than the price of
 
seed available in the informal system. Except during the 1975-80 period,
 
Certified Seed has been of relatively high and dependable quality; seed
 
from the informal system is of less dependable quality. Certified Seed is
 
usually in short supply and is rationed to growers in small lots; seed can
 
be obtained in any quantity in the informal system if the buyer is willing
 
to pay the guing price. The price of certified seed is fixed; in contrast,
 
the price of seed in the informal system fluctuates widely depending upon
 
supply and demand conditions. A considerable amount of planning and
 
paperwork is needed to obtain Certified Seed; this can be avoided by
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dealing with the informal system. Certified Seed is delivered to villages
 
through the nation-wide distribution system of the NACF; seed in the
 
informal system must be obtained in the alpine area or from merchants who
 
purchase it there. Many villages send representatives to the alpine area
 
to purchase seed. These representatives usually become establi'hed
 
clients of one or a few seed producers who have a good reputation for
 
producing 	 quality seed. 
Table 7. 	Estimation of alpine potato farmers "official" and 
"informal" seed production 1984 (t) 
Certified 	seed produced 1,200
 
"Leakages" from the official program 
Foundation Seed 	 105
 
Registered Seed 	 743
 
Certified 	Seed
 
Sub- to tal 4,308 
Assume 50% used for seed 2,154 
Total seed produced 	 3,354
 
Source: Tables A2.3, 2.4, 2.6 and 2.8. The estimated leakage of
 
Certified Seed assumes that seed growers sell 10 t/ha (or roughly 
half their output) outside the Seed Program. This assumption is
 
based on interviews with members of the KHCA and private seed
 
growers in the alpine region.
 
In conclusinn, Korea's Official Seed Certification Program and the 
informal system are intimately and symbiotically linked in many respects. 
The informal system obtains high-quallty seed from the Official Seed 
Program. Hence, the quality of seed distributed by the informal system 
depends on the quality of seed produced and distributed in the alpine area 
by the Official Seed Program. The Official Program also provides farmers 
in lowland areas with a steady, dependable, but limited supply of high
 
quality seed at a reasonable price. The informal system fills the coun­
try's residual seed requirement by multiplying serd obtained from the
 
Official Program and selling It as seed or table potatoes depending upon
 
prevailing market conditions.
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5. Costs and Benefits 
The Korean Seed Program is so complex that a detailed economic
 
assessment is beyond the scope of this paper. However, through the use of
 
available budgetary documents and production estimates, the program's
 
costs and benefits can be estimated In general terms.
 
Costs
 
Five principal inct;r nhe:Aus-. , their participa­fnstituticn "obr 
tiotn in the Seed Program: the AES, PSF, OSPD, NACF, and NAPIO. Budgetary

docunents availab e at AES, the PSF, and the Daekwalryung branch of OSPD 
indicate that from 1983 to 1985 their participation in the Seed Program 
resulted in expenses averaging approximately W 550 M (Table 8). It is more
 
difficult to estimate the Seed Program-related expenses of NAPIO, NACF, 
and the national headquarters of OSPD, since work with potatoes represents
 
only a small part of their activities. Based on budgetary figures and
 
interviews with management personnel, their expenses for 1984 are 
estimated to be W 150 M. This results in 
an estimated total annual cost 
of W 700 ki (IJS$ 800,000) for the Seed Program in the period 1983-85. 
Table 8. Esi imated budget for Seed Prog,:am 1983-85 (million W)
 
1983 1984 1985
 
AES 214 
 228 231
 
PSF 174 109 72
 
OSPD local branch 208 211 213
 
Sub-total (596) (548) (516)
 
OSPD headquarters 20 20 
 20
 
NAPIO 100 100 100
 
NACF and other costs 30 30 30
 
Sub-total (150) (150) (150)
 
Total budget 746 698 666
 
Source: Figures for AES, PSF, and OSPD local branch are 
from budget 
documents. Estimates for OSPD headquarters and NAPIO are based 
primarily on interviews with management personnel of these institu­
tions and a rathe' superficial look at budgetary figures. The
 
estimate for NACF and others is based solely on interviews.
 
Estimates include operating expenses, interest, rent, and deprecia­
tion on capital.
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In addition to the costs incurred by the various institutions in­
volved in producing and distributing Certified Seed, farmers now pay
 
slightly more, in real terms, for Certified Seed and improved common seed
 
than they paid for seed in the mid-1970s. According to official estimates
 
in 1985 Korean won, seed cost on average W 285/kg from 1975 to 1979, 
whereas in 1984 it cost W 340/kg (Table A 4.1). The difference of W 56/kg
 
can be considered an additional cost of the Seed Program. Hence, the
 
additional costs of the 24,000 t of seed 
used in the spring and summer
 
crops is ipproximately W 1.3 M (US$ 1.5 M). 
Benefits
 
From 1970 to 1976, spring and summer potato crops yielded on average

11.4 t/ha. By 1985 yields had climbed to an all-time high of 18.5 t/ha 
and In 1986 yields averaged 20.4 t/ha. Farmers, researchers and extension 
agents concur that this yield increase is due mainly to improved seed 
quality. Some other factors have undoubtedly contributed to the increase. 
One is that subsistence production in home gardens has declined and potato 
production has become more concentrated on better quality land. A second 
factor is that more farmers are now using "plastic mulch" - planting 
potatoes under strips of plastic that raise soil temperature, conserve 
moisture and help control weeds in the spring season. Farmers are also 
using somewhat more fertilizer and pesticides. Information compiled by 
the RDA's Farm Management Division indicates that since 1979 national 
average real production costs per hectare, net of seed, have changed
relatively little (Table 9). He-nce, it seems reasonable to conclude that
 
at least half the increase in yields is due to use of improved seed. 
If we assume that yields in 1985 were 3.5 t/ha above what they would
 
have been without the seed program the increased value of potato produc­
tion, at the average tarm-gate potato price of W 248/kg, 
 was
 
W 868,000/ha. Applied over the 29,000 ha of potatoes grown in the spring 
and summer crops, the incremental value of national potato production was 
roughly W 25,000 M (HSS 28 M). 
Table 9. Potato production costs per hectare 1979-85 (000 W/ha)
 
Total Seed Total ccct net of seed
 
cost cost current real
 
( .......... current prices ........ ) (1985 price6) a/
 
1979 1,411 261 1,150 1,936
 
1980 1,823 365 1,458 2,011
 
1981 2,290 566 1,724 1,858
 
1982 2,360 512 1,848 1,861
 
1983 2,698 606 2,092 2,063
 
1985 2,855 623 2,232 2,232
 
Source: RDA. Farm Managment Division and Table A 4.1. a/ Deflated by 
index of all prices paid by farmers (1985=100). 
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Comparing the costs and benefits, Korea's Seed Potato Program has
 
apparently generated net benefits of approximately W 24,000 M (nearly
 
U.$28 M) in 1985 and it had a benefit/cost ratio of 24:1. In other words,
 
for every WI,000 spent on the program, W24,000 were generated in addi­
tional farm incomes. Aside from these benefits to potato producers,
 
consumers also benefited from expanded supplies and reduced prices. In
 
the early 1980s, the real price of potatoes was about W 65!kg less than it
 
was in the early 1970s (Table A 4.3). Assuming that half the price
 
reduction was due to improved seed quality and that 60 percent of the
 
potatoes harvr.sted were consumed, the Seed Program's total annual benefits
 
to consumers was approximately W10,000 M.
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6. Some Issues for the Future 
The Korean Seed Potato Program is clearly successful. It produces 
and distributes high-quality seed, it is fully institutionalized in the
 
country's agricultural research and development system, and it generates
 
substantial economic benefits. This final section addresses five issues
 
that are likely to influence the future performance of the program.
 
* The amount of Certified Seed 1o produce
 
" The need for government subsidie3 to keep seed prices low
 
* The need for government involvement to ensure high seed quality 
" The role of the private sector in seed production and distribution
 
* The priority areas for future potato R&D
 
How Much Certified Seed Should Be Produced?
 
The SeeA Program is currently providing less than 20 percent of the 
total. seeu requirement. Hence, one might conclude that production of 
Certified Seed should be greatly increased. However, OSPD is hesitant to 
increase production. When it did so in 1982, the result was a surplus of 
Certified Seed potatoes that was disposed of by distributing it to staff 
members of the MAF and deducting the cost from their salaries. In other 
words MAF employees were penalized for overproduction of setd potatoes. 
Surpluses of any commodity, including seed potatoes, can only occur 
if the price is fixed above tbe market equilibrium price. The market 
prices of table and seed potatoes produced in the informal sector 
fluctuate continually in response to changing conditions of supply and
 
demand. Hence, there is always a risk that the market equilibrium price
 
of seed will fall below the government-niandated price resulting in a
 
surplus of Certified Seed. From 1978 until 1981 potato production
 
increased by more than 80 percent. The result was a drop in prices which
 
motivated farmers to reduce the area seeded to potatoes in 1982. When
 
OSPD increased the supply of Certified Seed that year and maintained a
 
fixed price, the inevitable result was a surplus.
 
Whereas public employees are penalized for overproduction of
 
Certified Seed, there are no similar penalties for underproduction. The
 
logical result is that officials tend to set conservative production
 
targets for Certified Seed. For this reason, it is unlikely that produc­
tion of Certified Seed will be expanded significantly. As will be shown
 
below, expanding the supply of Certified Seed could increase the Seed
 
Program's economic benefits. However, achieving this would require a more
 
flexible, market-oriented system.
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Are Government Subsidies Needed to Keep Seed Prices Low?
 
To date, AES has delivered Foundation Seed to the PSF free of charge. 
The PSF delivers Registered Seed to OSPD at a price of W 214/kg. OSPD, in 
turn, pays its concract growers W 345/kg for Certified Seed. This price 
structure, with the top grade seed being given away free and the bottom 
grade selling for the highest price, contrasts sharply with the price 
structure that would result from the free operation of market forces 
(Figure 8). In a market-oriented system, Input prices reflect their 
relative levels of productivity. Hence, In countries like Holland and the 
USA, the price of Foundation Seed Is hLiher than that of Registered Seed, 
which in turn is higher than the price of Certified Seed. 
The principal justification for the peculiar price structre In Korea 
is to ensure that an adequate supply of Certified Seed Is ma.e available 
to lowland farmers each year at reasonable prices. It is assumed that if 
Foundation Seed were sold at cost and Registered and Certified Seed were 
produced by private growers in a free-market -nvironment, less Certified 
Seed would be produced and its price would be higher. This assumption is 
questionable. It has already been noted that the supply of Certified Seed
 
meets only a smai I fract ion of the total seed requi rement. Data from the 
MAF also show that since 1981 the price of seed potatoes has been higher, 
relative to the price of table potatoes, than during the previous decade 
(Table 10). lie'.ice, an important question is: Could a market-oriented 
seed system, wichout productio, targets, fixed prices, or subsidies, 
produce Certified Seed as abundantly and cheaply as the present system? 
Table 10. Prices of seed and table potatoes 1967-86
 
Table Seed Relative 
potatoes potatoes seed 
(....... W/3.75 kg......p) p a 
1967 61 86 141 
1968 58 108 186 
1969 54, 99 183 
1970 60 142 237 
1971 78 172 221 
t972 108 176 163 
1973 142 199 140 
1974 211 313 148 
1975 195 307 157 
1976 260 324 125 
1977 345 386 ill­
1978 612 569 93 
1979 726 776 107 
1980 667 1,006 151 
1981 689 1,236 179 
1982 539 1,221 227 
1983 669 1,268 190 
1984 656 1,277 195 
1985 876 1,471) 168 
1986 782 1,513 193 
Source: Table A 4.1. a/ (Seed price/table potato 
price)*100. 
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The present quota system and pricing structure, with heavily sub­
sidized prices for Foundation and Registered Seed is highly beneficial to 
the PSF and to members of the MGCA, who obtain Foundation and Registered 
Seed at far below the true market value. It is not clear, however, that 
this system is beneficial to table potato producers or to consumers. 
Within 	the official nor'ms of 
the Seed Program, the PSF has exclusive
 
access 	 to Foundation Seed and members of tne KHCA have exclusive access to 
Registered Seed. Accounts of the PSF, of members of the KICA, and of 
commercial producers of table potatoes indicate that the PSF is high­a 
cost producer of Registered Seed and that members of 
the KHCA earn excep­
tionally high profits from Certified Seed production (Table ]1).
 
The PqF's costs are particularly high in the areas of salaries and 
wages, capital, arnd -!fo:ni-,catlve overhead. Since the PSF does not have 
technicians with specialized training in seed production, mno 't observers 
believe that experienced private farmers in the area could produce high­
quality Registered Seed more efficiently and cheaper than the PSF.
 
Because members of the MCA have exclusive access to Registered Seed 
at a subsidized price and they sell Certified Seed at a higher fixed 
price, 	production of Certified Seed 
potatoes is one of the most profitable
qgricultural enterprises in the Republic of Korea, and contract seed 
growers are among Korea's wealthiest farmers. In 1984 and 1985 net 
earnings of seed growers were 60 percent over total. production costs
 
(Table 11).
 
Figure 8. 	 Actual and market-derived prices of Foundation, Registered and Certified 
Seed 
W/kg 
1000 
market-derived prices 
800[ 
60011 
i-	 ­
400 0 
2000 
actual prices 
01
 
Foundation Registered Certified
 
seed seed seed
 
Source: Tables 10 and A 2.9. 
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Table 11. Eut.mated production costs and returns per hectare for
 
Kangweon Provincial Seed Farm, contract seed growers and 
table potato producers (000 W)
 
Provincial Contract Table 
Seed seed potato 
Farm grower producer 
Seed 0 300 623
 
Fertilizer 615 611 309
 
Pesticide and herbicide 226 306 42
 
Light and fuel 299 23 
Other materials 472 165 253 
Depreciation 183 
machinery 201 75
 
build I ngs 78 15 
Repairs 231 3 16 
Taxes and charges 196 56 56 
Hired labor 1,610 936 227 
Family labor 1,922 396 807 
Interest
 
operating capital 182 121 32
 
fixed capital 223 910 a/ 63 
Rent 834 315 
Total cost 7,089 3,987 2,856 
Gross return 6,537 b/ 3,560 c/ 
Percent return d/ 64 25
 
Source: Cost estimates for the PSF are from PSF records. Estimated 
costs and reLtrns for a representative seed grower are from KHCA 
records. Estimates for a commercial spring-crop grower are from RDA 
Farm Management Division (official escimates), a,' Includes rent. 
b/ Farmers produced 14.3 t/ha of seed potatoes v-Led at W 345/kg 
and 7.9 t/ha of table potatoes valued at W 200/kg. c/ Farmers 
produced 17.8 t/ha of table potatoes valued at W 2C0/kg. d (gross 
return-total cost)/total cost.
 
It is likely that a more open system with flexible prices and 
opportunities for a broader range of private farmers to produce Registered 
and Certified Seed would produce more Certified Seed at a lower price. The 
following calculations illustrate this likelihood. 
The 1984 production cost for Foundation Seed is estimated to be just
 
over W 1,100 (Table 12). If AES sold Foundation Seed to private farmers 
for W 1,000/kg, these fa-mers could profitably grow Registered Seed at a 
cost of about W 500/'kg and sell it to Certified Seed growers for W 570/kg. 
Certified Seed growers, in turn, could profitably sell Certified Seed to 
lowland producers of consumer potatoes for about W 360, or 10 percent less
 
than the price OSPD currently charges (Table A 2.9). It is important to 
note that the only direct production subsidy in these calculations is the
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difference between the production cost and selling price of Foundation
 
Seed. A second notable point is that this type of market-oriented system
 
would generate substantially more Certified Seed than the present Seed
 
Program. At the yields and seed rates assumed in Table 11, the initial
 
200 t of Foundation Seed would generate 2,000 t of Registered Seed and,
 
potentially 20,000 t of Certified Seed. If only half this target were
 
obtained, CertJfied Seed production would still be nearly double the
 
current level.
 
Table 12. 	 Production cost estimates for Foundation, Registered and
 
Certiried Seed 1984
 
COOW W/kg 
Foundation Seed
 
Prodn cost/kg 1,140 a/
 
Registered 	Seed
 
Prodn cost/ha net of seed b/ 4,424 
Plus seed cost c/ + 1,500 
Plus 25% profit + 1,481 
Less sale of table potatoes d/ - i,000 
= Cost of 15t Registered Seed 6,406 
Prodn. cost/kg 494 
Plus 15% for storage and marketing + 74 
= Price to Certified Seed growers 568 
Certified Seed
 
Prodn cost/ha net of seed e/ 3,687
 
Plus seed cost (W 586 x 1,500 kg) 852
 
Plus 25% profit + 1,135
 
Less sale of table potatoes d/ - 1,000
 
= Cost of 15 t Certified Seed 4,674
 
Prodn cost/kg 311 
Plus 15% for storage and marketing 47 
= Price co growers of table potatoes 358 
Sources and Notes: a/ AES budget for Seed Program divided by Foundation 
Seed produced in 1984 (W 228 M/200 t) derived from Tables 7 and A 2.3. 'b/ 
The production cost for Registered Seed growers, net of seed, is assumed 
to be 20 percent greater than 2ertified Seed growers (derived fro.a Table 
10). c/ This calculation assumes a seed rate of 1,500 kg/ha and a price 
of W 1,000/kg for Foundation Seed. d/ Assumes that farmers sell one-third 
of the harvest (5t/ha) as consumer potatoes at a price of W200/kg. e/ 
From Table 10. 
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Is Government Control Needed to Ensure Lh Quality? 
A major justification for the government's heavy involvement in seed 
potato production (particularly the production of Registered Seed) is that 
high standards of seed quality would not be maintained if responsibility 
were turned over to t',e private sector. This argument overlooks the fact 
that the key to Korea's success in seed potato production is in the virus­
free basic seed supplied annually by AES and HES. Once this seed reaches 
the field, infection begins, and the virus detection and elimination 
procedures used in field inspections and winter tests have not bten
 
entirely satisfactory. The PSF, which is responsible for producing all 
the registered seed for spring and summer crops, does not have tecnically 
trained personnel for seed potato production. Hence, as long as AES and 
TIES continue to produce virus-free basic seed and as long as a "flushout 
system" is used (with no seed re-certified) there is little reason to
 
believe that Registered Seed produced by qualified private growers would 
be of lower quality than that produced by the PSF.
 
What is the Appropriate Role of the Private Sectore 
Seed inspection is probably the weakest link in the present seed 
system, and it would surely be so in an expanded system that involved many
 
more 
private seed growers. Rigorous field inspection is essential to
 
ensure high quality standards and to pinpoint the responsibility for 
deficiencies when they arise. NAPTO has had more problems with seed 
potatoes than with any other crop. 
 NAPIO does not employ specialized seed
 
potato inspectors. Its field staff is responsible for inspecting all
 
crops. The requirerents for inspecting cereals are quite different, and 
much simpler, than those for potatoes. The main task for inspectors of 
rice and other gtains is to check for the presence of weed seeds and
 
varietal mixtures in seed lots. In potatoes, it is essential to observe 
plants in the field and to correctly identify symptoms of viruses as well
 
as other diseases and pests. This requires a great deal of training and
 
experience. Since the potato growing season is short, certification also
 
takes good planning, coordination, and an ample transportation budget.
 
High quality standards are maintained in the Basic Seed through
 
systematic laboratory testing for viruses. In the later field multiplica­
tion stages, because of the large volume of potatoes that must be
 
inspected, virus identification is inevitably less systematic and relies 
mainly on visual inspection rather than laboratory tests.
 
Formally, NAPIO is 
responsible for seed inspection and certification,
 
but in this area, as in the larger seed system, an "informal system" 
operates. Since NAPIO does not have an adequate number of 
trained seed
 
potato 
inspectors, and because staff of the various institutions
 
participating in the Seed Program feel responsible for seed quality, a
 
type of inter-institutional tep.. system has evolved for seed inspection.
 
When Foundaticn Seed ib ispected on AES, representatives of the PSF, 
KHCA, HES, and MAF participate along with NAPIO personnel. When
 
Registered and Certified Seed is inspected, AES staff members also take 
part. In essence, seed is certified on the basis of a consensus of
 
representatives of the participating institutions 
in the seed program,
 
rather than on the basis of rigid technical criteria.
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If the Seed Program were to move in the direction of a market­
oriented system, with many more private farmers and significantly larger
 
volumes of seed involved, maintenance of quality standards would neces­
sitate a more rigorous and systematic approach to seed potato inspection,
 
testing and certification. More clearcut responsibilities, quality
 
standards, and criteria for acceptance or rejection of fields and seed 
lots would be needed. It would also be essential to strengthen of the
 
technical capabilities of the institution responsible for seed potato
 
inspection and certification through training and specialization of
 
personnel in work with seed potatoes. More manpower and an expanded
 
budget for field inspections and laboratory testing would also be re­
quired. These resources could be provided from a portion of the savings 
resulting from eliminating the present subsidies for producing Foundation,
 
Registered and Certified Seed. 
The successful devolution of responsibility for producing seed 
require that private farmers receive specialized training in practical
 
aspects of seed potato production. They would also need to take greater 
responsibility for the quality of seed they produce. A specialized Seed
 
Potato Producers Association could play useful roles in training and
 
developmnt of group responsibility for seed quality. Such an association
 
could also provide a mechanism for financing seed inspection and testing. 
The public sector, through the MAF and its affiliated organizations, 
has played a crucial, pioneering role in establishing the Seed Potato
 
Certification Program. However, the program's future performance might be
 
enhanced by focusing the public sector's resources more sharply on those
 
activities for which it has a comparative advantage: research, production
 
of Basic and Elite Seed, inspection, and certification. The private
 
sector could gradually take over responsibility for producing and 
distributing Certified, Registered, and Foundation Seed. A logical series
 
of steps would be: 
" Strengthen NAPIO's technical capacity and expand the budget for seed 
potato inspection
 
" Simplify seed potato marketing procedures, expanding the role of 
market prices in decision-making
 
" Establish a Seed Potato Producers Association (SPPA)
 
" Eliminate the fixed prices and quotas for Registered and Certified 
Seed and allow private farmers selected by the SPPA to purchase 
Foundation and Registered seed at prices that reflect true market 
values
 
" Transfer responsibility for production of Foundation Seed to the 
private sector
 
The first four steps could be taken virtually immediately and simul­
taneously. It may be prudent to delay the final step for one or two years
 
after the initial reorganization of the Seed Program begins. However, it
 
may be difficult to finance step one (which requires additional expendi­
tures) until steps four and five (which reduce subsidies) are implemented.
 
Hence, it may be most practical to implement all five steps simultaneously.
 
R&D Priorities
 
Korea's potato program has succeeded in increasing the country's 
potato yields by reducing virus levels in planting material. Nevertheless,
 
average potato consumption remains low -- around 10 kg per head per year. 
There appear to be several reasons for this. Farmers still find that
 
quality seed is scarce and costly. Given Korea's limited farmland area
 
and the limited financial and human resources of the government agencies
 
involved, it seems clear that a move toward greater private sector
 
involvement in seed production could help alleviate this problem.
 
There is also a clear need is for greater genetic diversity. Korean
 
farmers, consumers, and processors could make good use of new varieties 
adapted to the country's diverse ecological environments and to new uses 
of potatoes (particularly the production of chips and frozen french 
fries). Stepping up breeding and varietal selection would require more 
hum i resources, vehicles and funds for regional trials. At present only 
two senior researchers and five junior researchers are employed by the 
AES, HES and the Namhae sub-station to carry out all the tissue culture 
work and potato breeding. Vehicles, travel budget and time so limitedare 
that researchers usually visit the few regional trials conducced by pro­
vincial RDA officers only once each year. 
A third priority is post-harvest R&D. At present no storage work -­
either for seed or table potatoes -- is being conducted by the program. 
Seed is seldom available during the winter months when snow blocks ship­
ping from the alpine areas to the lowlands. This makes it difficult for
 
farmers in the southern part of Korea to plant in late winter and earl. 
spring, when they would like to do so. Improved seed storage methods 
could help farmers plant off season and supply urban markets when supplies
 
are scarce and prices are high. Improved methods for storing consumer 
potatoes could also allow farmers hold their crop off the market at the 
end of the main spring crop when prices are at their lowe.4
 
One of the most difficult problems is expansion of potato production
 
in the fall season, which is very short (bounded by hot, rainy weather at
 
the beginning and by cold weather at the end of che season). 
 Use of early

varieties and true potato seed (TPS) offer potential solutions. Planting 
TPS may help farmers avoid the problem of rotting seed tubers. Prelimi­
nary results ars promising, but more on-farm testing is needed.
 
In conclusion, now that the basic problems of clean seed production
 
have been solved, the National Program needs to turn its attention to 
providing a broader range of varieties suitable 
for different agro­
ecological zones, cropping systems, and processing. More attention also
 
needs to be paid to the post-harvest sector, both to facilitate processing
 
and to even the flow of fresh potatoes to the country's rapidly growing 
urban markets. More on-farm research is needed to identify farmers' and
 
consumers' requirements and to test potential new technologies, like TPS,
 
under representative farming conditions.
 
The resources needed for these tasks could be made available if some 
of the current seed production activities were transferred to the private
 
sector.
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Statistical Annex 
The statistical annex contains background data on Korean agriculture,
 
potato production and use and seed production and distribution. The
 
figures, compiled from a number of sources, are presented in 21 tables
 
grouped under four headings.
 
Annex 1. Potato Production
 
A 1.1 	 Harvested area, yield, production and consumption
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Annex 1. Potato Production 
Table A 1.1. Harvested area, yield, production and consump­
tion of potatoes in Korea 1953-86 
Prodn per 
Area Yield Prodn Population capita 
Year (000 ha) (t/ha) (000 t) (million) (kg) 
1953 45 8.5 385 
1954 44 5.3 234 
1955 49 7.4 354 21.4 17 
1956 48 7.5 363 22.0 16 
1957 58 8.1 465 22.7 21 
1958 49 8.7 423 23.3 18 
1959 47 8.2 385 24.0 16 
1960 47 8.9 421 24.7 17 
1961 48 9.7 463 25.7 18 
1962 49 8.5 412 26.4 16 
1963 46 8.6 391 27.1 14 
1964 47 12.2 571 27.8 21 
1965 60 9.6 581 28.5 20 
1966 60 11.4 688 29.2 24 
1967 58 9.7 566 29.8 19 
1968 60 10.3 617 30.5 20 
1969 56 10.7 599 31.2 19 
1970 54 11.3 605 31.9 19 
1971 52 11.3 589 32.6 18 
1972 43 10.6 459 33.2 14 
1973 42 11.3 470 33.9 14 
1974 43 10.9 469 34.6 14 
1975 52 12.7 660 35.3 19 
1976 49 11.7 569 35.9 16 
1977 50 11.2 558 36.5 15 
1978 39 7.8 304 37.0 8 
1979 34 10.6 356 37.6 9 
1980 37 11.9 446 38.1 12 
1981 41 13.5 554 38.7 14 
1982 36 15.0 539 39.3 14 
1983 30 15.5 469 40,0 12 
1984 26 16.8 436 40.6 11 
1985 31 18.5 575 41.3 14 
1986 28 20.4 577 41.9 14 
Source: FAO. Basic Data Unit (unpublished) and United Nations
 
Demographic Yearbouk 1966 (Geneva, 1967).
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Table A 1.2. 

Area 	(ha)
 
1982 

1983 

1984 

1985 

1986 

Production (t)
 
1982 

1983 

1984 

1985 

1986 

Yield (t/ha)
 
1982 

1983 

1984 

1985 

1986 

Source: MAF. 

winter season.
 
Harvested area, production and yield of potatoes
 
in three main cropping seasons 132-86
 
Spring 

crop 

29,528 

23,737 

19,758 

22,777 

20,646 a/ 

396,144 

341,444 

295,198 

365,413 

384,016 

13.4 

14.4 

14.9 

16.0 

18.6 

Summer 

crop 

3,956 

4,722 

4,662 

6,519 

5,596 

109,742 

105,257 

119,956 

186,076 

161,612 

27.7 

22.3 

25.7 

28.5 

28.9 

Fall
 
crop Total
 
2,538 36,022
 
1,772 30,231
 
1,507 25,927
 
1,808 31,104
 
1,492 27,734
 
32,631 538,517
 
22,246 468,947
 
20,472 435,626
 
23,640 575,129
 
20,052 565,680
 
12.9 14.9
 
12.6 15.5
 
13.6 16.8
 
13.1 18.5
 
13.4 20.4
 
Official estimates. a/ Tncludes 802 ha In
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Table A 1.3. Potato production, area and yield by province
 
1970-85
 
1970 

Production (t) 
Kyonpgi 69,127 
Kangweot 177,318 
Chungbuk 65,038 
Chungnam 31,756 
Chonbuk 62,902 
Chonnam 34,825 
Kyongbuk 105,510 
Kyoignam 56,033 
Chejt 2,644 
Total 605,151 
Harvested area (ha) 
Kyonggi 5,264 
Kangweon 14,658 
Chungbuk 5,546 
Chungnam 3,270 
Chonbuk 5,544 
Chounam 3,365 
Kvongbuk 10,943 
Kyunganam 5,247 
Cheju 146 
Total 53,983 
Yield (t/ha) 
Kyonggi 13.1 
Kangweon 12.1 
Chungbuk 11.7 
Chungnam 9.7 
Chonbuk 11.3 
Chonnam 10.3 
Kyongbuk 9.6 
Kyongnam 10.7 
Cheju 18.1 
Weighted average 11.2 
1975 

79,023 

179,563 

54,233 

46,027 

35,325 

46,188 

140,657 

79,112 

14,671, 

674,798 

5,602 

13,645 

4,512 

3,842 

2,939 

3,354 

11,702 

6,301 

795 

52,692 

14.1 

13.2 

12.0 

12.0 

12.0 

13.8 

12.0 

12.6 

18.5 

12.8 

1980 1985 
23,156 19,473 
128,792 291,511 
28,208 20,633 
30,576 16,294 
36,792 26,465 
45,629 60,045 
54,845 59,869 
80,373 63,316 
17,732 17,523 
446,104 575,129 
2,346 1,596 
10,088 12,103 
2,720 1,514 
2,896 1,313 
2,821 1,750 
3,272 3,988 
6,249 3,613 
5,895 4,044 
1 1,187 
37,392 31,104 
9.9 12.2 
12.8 24.1 
10.4 13.6 
10.6 12.4 
13.0 15.1 
13.9 15.1 
8.8 16.6 
13.6 15.7 
16.0 14.8 
11.9 18.5 
Source: MAF. Statistical Yearbook of Agriculture, Forestry and
 
Fisheries (Seoul, various years).
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Annex 2. Seed Certification 
o1he A 2-L -Spcxg and m r ops: Basi., Elite, Famiatikn, R st and CertifieuI &dSe jm d 
1961-45
 
Baic Seed Elite I Seed Elite II Sx -aricn Seed Regstered Sed C rtified Seed 
Year area p area prdn arm prrxh area pron area proin are prod(ha) (t) t) (ha) (t) (ha) (t) (ha) (t) (ha) (t) 
1961 9 82 50 509 
1962 2.0 8 9 82 50 500 
1963 2.0 912 38 86 860 
1964 3.0 18 9 73 77 617 
1965 2.3 17 13 6863 680 
1966 3.6 3 13 13 33 331 
1967 3.6 1022 122 60 600 
1968 3.6 22 13 144 83 834 
1969 1.3 9 6.7 44 13 147 89 894 
1970 1.3 8 6.7 43 27 133270 i,36 112 1,120
1971 1.7 9 7.0 43 27 233 133 941 122 1,1U9
Iq72 1.5 8 5.5 33 25 240 133 1,330 196 1,379
1973 1.9 11 9.4 39 29 2 163 1,348 371 2,964

1974 2.2 11 8.8 46 35 
 216 200 1,400 471 3,274
 
1975 2.2 
 11 8.9 45 34 270 225 1,440 502 2,961

1976 1.7 10 7.6 98 25 251 188 1,501 750 6,139

1977 1.9 8.3 31 14010 42 297 1,12M 774 4,95
 
1978 1.8 13 7.5 
 38 31 183 150 1,012 622 3,1.69
1979 3.0 10 9.3 47 31 133 110 536 595 a/
1980 5.5 25 17 151 80 915 127 1,939 
1981 0.2 1.5 2.5 23 9 147 80L 849 330 3,340 
1982 0.2 1.7 2.5 27 12 176 89 1,140 465 4,665
1983 0.2 3.1 2.5 24 3 150 80 1,504 333 4,367 
1984 0.2 1.8 1.7 15 11 121 55 1,140 346 4,770
1985 0.3 2.0 1.4 14 10 114 36 793 334 4,564 
Saurm AFS, PSF, ard CED rn-miti. a/ All Certified Seed fields were rejected in 1979 due to hmvy vims 
infectkcn. Blac s indicate that no see of tha reetive class us prrd thd at year. Basic, Elite,
ard Fxrdatin See is pnxkmd by AS; REgisteral Seed is prdtred by PSE. Catified See is Rted by 
mnia-t seed grnam, under tIe stp;rvision of CEfD. 
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Thhke A 2.2. RhU ard witer crqm Ikic, E1Ite, Founitkxi. RqosiedXK ard Cartif id Seed podumd 1966-C6 
Certif d Seed 
Basic Seed Elite I Seed Elite 11 Seed Facxnaticn Seed Retstered Seed Fal Crop Wnt C-. 
mm pror, -Te prcdn arm pmb arna Frdn arm prrrn area prodn area Fran 
Ymr (W)Q) (IT) (in (t) (In) (t) (ha) (t) (1n) (t) (n) t) (ha) t) 
1966 3.4 26 
1%7 3.4 26 
1X8 1.1 4.8 3.4 26 
1%9 0.1 0.9 0.6 4.2 3.4 27 
1970 0.1 0.9 0.6 3.1 1.7 14 
1971 0.1 0.9 0.6 3.4 1.7 17 
1972 0.1 0.9 0.5 3.0 3.4 30 
1973 0.2 1.0 0.8 4.0 3.4 33 
1974 0.2 1.0 0.8 4.0 3.4 30 
1975 0.2 1.0 0.8 4.0 3.4 28 
1976 0.2 1.0 0.8 4.4 3.4 27 
1977 0.2 1.2 0.8 4.5 3.4 27 
1978 0.2 1.0 0.8 4.5 4.0 25 
1979a/ 1.0 6.3 3.4 27 16 60 
19Y3 1.3 9.8 4.0 27 16 43 37 335 
1931 300 420 1.3 6.0 3./4 27 16 100 22 170 
1982 ?CL 420 1.3 7.0 3.6 33 21 197 17 245 
193 333 412D 1.3 9.0 3.2 33 10 11109 173 131 
194 3T 43 1.3 7.0 2.9 29 13 121 12 116 14 20 
1985 31 43), 1.3 5.4 3.0 35 15 165 17 250 /0 650 
1986 3) 480 1.3 5.4 3.0 2036 260 16 250 50 800 
SuTxru3e AM, 1I., ,n-d CSI recxds. a/ Prior to 1979, AS rodnal Elit Seed, in13 proJucadtre atikn wl Ri~gstered Seed,
,-d KrA prilced Certified Secd. After 1979, TO becane r rr-! ible for prxonIrg Basic, Elite, and Ftxndation Seed, and 
MR) b-gm pnhrnr lrgistered and Certifiel Seed, tht'agh m-n-rats amr -itswith private faxma. Hla* s Irdcate 
that no sd of the respective &tz was prcxhxd tint r or tint reords are not awai'ble due to the chW of resporsible 
orpntzitIn. 
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Table A 2.3. Foundation Seed for spring and summer crops: production
 
and use 1979-85
 
Seed Seed Recipient of harvested seed 
Area planted harvested PSF OSPD KHCA Other a/ 
(ha) (.................. t ........................... 
1979 31.3 37.5 198 0 133 65 0 
1980 16.2 19.8 190 104 0 77 9 
1981 8.5 10.2 172 113 0 16 43 
1982 11.7 14.0 251 132 44 75 0 
1983 12.5 19.0 272 126 24 104 18 
1984 11.0 17.0 226 120 0 105 1 
1985 9.5 12.0 188 148 0 33 7 
Sogrce: AES records. a/ Primarily used for research.
 
Table A 2.4. 	Registered Seed for spring and summer crops: 
production and use 1983-85 
1983 1984 1985
 
Total production (t) 1,504 1,141 1,553
 
Registered Seed delivered
 
to OSPD (t) 241 398 515
 
Certified Seed sold to
 
farmers (t) 531 248 660
 
Other uses and losses (t) 732 495 378
 
Total area planted (ha) 80 55 80
 
Total yield (t/ha) 18.8 20.7 19.4
 
Yield of Registered Seed (t/ha) 3.0 7.2 6.4
 
Yield of Registered and
 
Certified Seed 	(t/ha) 9.7 11.7 14.7
 
Source: PSF records.
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ille A 2.5. OktiffdeSeed: ix:tix n s stks cf MA 1961-5 
Averge Area 4ch Price reciv 
Nwber area 2fpd inspection Certified Seed for Certified 
of seed inspeted %amea Enj~xm t)- Seed a! 
grre-s (ha) inspected ha total Fer ha (11) 
1961 10 50 5fl 10.0 
1962 l100 50 500 10, 0 
1963 100 86 %0 10.0 
1964 10 77 617 8.0 
1965 10) C 6(a 10.0 
1966 !00 33 331 10.0 
1967 1(00 w0 60 IC1.0 
1968 IM 83 834 10.0 
1969 1o 89 894 10.0 
1970 166 0.7 10 112 1,120 10.0 22 
1971 193 0.6 10 122 1,119 9.2 30 
1972 214 1.4 64 198 1,379 7.0 32 
1973 302 1.4 90 371 2,964 8.0 42 
1974 382 1.3 95 471 3,274 7.0 57 
1975 342 1.6 92 502 2,961 5.9 66 
1976 288 1.7 95 478 4,10 8.6 76 
1977 361 1.6 88 513 3,300 6.4 93 
1978 336 1.3 56 239 2,062 8.6 234 
1979 333 0 0 0 0 
1980 40 2.1 98 82 812 9.9 330 
1981 147 1.4 10 210 2,108 10.0 340 
1982 149 1.9 99 277 3,626 13.1 345 
1983 10 222 2,913 13.1 345 
1984 100 231 2,310 10.0 345 
1985 100 248 2,483 10.0 345 
Soxmn KFrA renrds. a/ All prices are for Irim Cobbler variety. The price of 
srior us W30/kg in 1984 and W340/g in 1985. Blak signify tht no 
data are armilable. 
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Table A 2.6. Certified Seed: production under the auspices of
 
OSPD-Daekwalryung Branch 1976-85
 
Seed produced by variety a/
 
Seed produced irish
 
Area per ha total cobbler Superior Dejima
 
(ha) (...................... t .......................)
 
1976 750 8.3 6,200 6,200 0 0
 
1977 774 6.5 5,019 5,019 0 0
 
1978 621 5.5 3,427 3,427 0 0
 
1979 595 0 
 0 0 0 
 0
 
1980 126 9.8 1,230 1,230 0 0
 
198! 333 10.0 3,315 3,315 0 0
 
1982 465 12.4 5,750 4,408 1,346 0
 
1983 333 13.0 4,3311 2,873 1,3 2 149
 
1984 346 13.2 4,583 2,158 2,215 210
 
1985 304 18.0 5,430 662 4,157 661
 
Source: OSPD-Daekwalryung Branch records. 
 a/ Irish Cobbler and
 
Superior are produced for the spring and sun-mer crops. Dejima is
 
produced for the winter crop.
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Table A 2.7. Certified Seed Potatoes: national production estimates
 
1965-84
 
Average Area which Certified Seed 
Number 
of fields 
field 
size 
passed inspection 
% area total 
produced a/ 
total per ha 
inspected (ha) inspected (ha) (t) (t) 
1965 5,718 0.16 91 827 2,688 3.2
 
1966 4,217 0.22 82 761 2,605 3.4
 
1967 3,556 0.22 86 683 3,104 4.5
 
1968 5,116 0.20 94 987 7,243 7.3
 
1969 4,405 0.27 89 1,092 5,866 5.4
 
1970 3,960 0.28 94 1,057 7,437 7.0
 
1971 4,426 0.25 76 849 6,005 7.1
 
1972 3,893 0.32 64 789 6,161 7.8
 
1973 6,790 0.25 80 1,361 9,798 7,2
 
1974 4,694 0.34 83 1,336 9,288 7.0
 
1975 3,630 0.41 84 1,247 6,111 4.9
 
1976 1,697 0.44 95 750 6,191 8.2
 
1977 1,285 0.60 90 700 5,019 7.2
 
1978 1,027 0.50 86 448 3,427 7.6
 
1979 3,868 0.20 
 11 88 651 7.4
 
1980 432 0.49 
 95 202 1,599 7.9
 
1981 876 0.52 98 448 3,613 8.1
 
1982 1,208 0.51 96 592 6,228 10.5
 
1983 82! 0.53 100 434 4,978 11.5
 
1984 830 0.56 100 
 462 6,013 13.0
 
Source: MAF. Statistical Yearbook of Agriculture, Forest & Fisheries
 
(Seoul, various years). a/ Amount of seed which passed inspection.
 
Seed potato inspection was first reported in the Statistical Yearbook
 
in 1965.
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Table A 2.3. Certified Seed Potatoes sold in each Province 1983-85 (t)
 
Province a/ 1983 1984 
 1985
 
Kyonggi 460 500 605
 
Kangweon 1,313 1,462 1,717
 
Chungbuk 224 322 359
 
Chungnam 194 203 231
 
Chonbuk 207 258 296
 
Chonnam 168 316 328
 
Kyongbuk 750 748 1,025
 
Kyongnam 718 735 791
 
Cheju 131 205 646
 
Not specified 202 21 0
 
Total 4,367 4,770 5,998
 
Source: OSPD-Daekwalryung Branch records, a/ All seed produced in 
the Alpine area is for the spring and summer crops except that sold 
in Cheju, which is for the winter crop. 
Table A 2.9. Registered and Certified Seed prices 1976-85 (W/kg)
 
Price paid by Price of Certified Seed 
contract purchase price b/ selling price c/ 
growers for Irish Superior in the in the 
Regi 2 ered Seed a/ cobbler Dejima spring fall 
1976 76 78
 
1977 
 93 111 
1978 234 280 
1979 d/ -- -- --
1980 330 380 347 
1981 214 340 400 374 
1982 214 345 345 410 390 
1983 214 345 345 410 390 
1984 214 345 330 410 380 
1985 214 345 340 410 390 
Source: OSPD-Daekwalryung Branch records. a/ This is the price at 
which the PSF delivers Registered Seed to OSPD. b/ This is the price 
that OSPD pays contract growers for Certified Seed. c/ OSPD sells 
Certified Seed at a uniform price throughout Korea. d/ Due to high 
virus levels in seed fields, no seed was certified in 1979. Blank 
spaces signify that no data are available. 
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Annex 3. Virus Levels 
Table A 3.1. 	 Plants with visual symptoms of virus diseases in
 
Foundation Seed fields of Irish Cobbler variety
 
1979-85 (Z)
 
Plants
 
eliminated Virus
 
before observed Total
 
inspection a/ at inspection virus
 
1979 23.4 4.6 28.0
 
1980 7.4 1.6 9.0
 
1981 2.4 1.1 3.5
 
1982 1.9 0.2 2.1
 
1983 0.1 0.1 0.2
 
1984 0.1 0.1 0.2
 
1985 0.1 0.1 0.2
 
Source: AES records. a/ Plants with visual symptoms of virus
 
diseases are eliminated from the tield, or "rogued out" before the
 
field is officially inspected by NAPIO.
 
Table A 3.2. 	 Plants and tubers with visual symptoms of virus
 
diseases in Registered Seed fields 1980-85
 
Plants in field Tubers in winter test b/
 
plants virus at total Irish
 
eliminated a/ inspection virus Cobbler Superior
 
1980 12.9 2.3 15.2 5.3
 
1981 5.0 0.6 5.6 n.d.
 
1982 9.1 0.1 9.2 7.8 0.8
 
1983 3.7 0.3 4.0 15.6 c/ 0.2
 
1984 5.6 0.3 5.9 2.0 0.5
 
1985 1.0 0.2 1.2 0.0 0.0
 
Source: PSF records. al See footnote a/ Table A 3.1. b/ The 
winter test is conducted at HES, Suweon. c/ Imported seed. 
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Table A 3.3. 	Total virus diseases observed in Certified Seed
 
fields by variety (% plants)
 
Irish 
Cobbler a/ Superior b/ DeJ ima c/ 
1981 10.6
 
1982 13.1 11.6
 
1983 7.3 4.1 15.8
 
1984 17.2 5.1 6.6
 
1985 4.1 5.9 7.7
 
Source: OSPD - Daekwalryung Branch records. a/ The virus 
level was high in 1984 because many growers used Cert-fied 
Seed, rather than Registered Seed, as planting material. The 
first locally produced tissue culture lines of Irish Cobbler 
reached Certified Seed growers in 1985. b! The first locally 
produced tissue culture lines of Superior reached Cercified 
Seed growers in 1983. c/ Basic and Foundation Seed of 
Dejima, which are certified for winter-season growers in Cheju 
Island, are produced by HES in Suweon and Namhae. 
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Table A 3.4. PL3ts with vLsual symptDB of v1D8 diseas in Rixdathx4 Rqg sLxW and Cetiffd Sd ffrleI (t) 
Utxnatian Seed Regstered Seed Certified Seed 
plints vinis at Total plants vinis at Total plants vins at Total 
elrnlnted a/ ljbtln vinu elmirmtead a/ irspctcr vins elimlnteda/ insjrction vnms 
Irish cdider varietv 
1978 14.0 1.1 15.1 26.9 3.5 30.4 [5.0 20.0 35.0
 
1979 21.4 0.6 22.0 61.0 3.0 64.0 b/ I/

1983 6.4 
 0.5 6.9 9.0 2.3 11.3 8.5 3.0 11.5
 
1981 1.9 0.3 2.2 5.5 
 0.6 6.1 3.1 1.3 4.4
 
1982 1.9 0.2 2.1 9.i 0.1 
 9.2 9.5 2.7 12.2 
1983 0.1 0.2 0.3 6.2 1.1 7.3 5.2 1.4 6.6
 
1984 8
0.1 0.1 0.2 8.2 0.3 8.5 16 . _r/ 0.4 17.2
 
1985 0.2 0.2 0.4 1.9 
 0.2 2.1 3.7 0.4 4.1 
StPMiir variety 
1984 0.1 0.1 0.2 2.8 0.3 3.1 4.9 0.2 5.1
 
1985 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.7 0.2 0.9 5.4 0.5 5.9 
1984 6.3 0.4 6.7
 
1985 7.1 0.6 7.7 
Swtm \It0o rucods a/ See frixte a! Table A 3.1. b/ All flelds wre rej cted due to haxn-y virns infectim. 
c/ Virus infectn wns heavy in 1984, bcase nay fanters niltiplied Certifled Seed a 5 time. la* spim 
Sigiify ~it no data are available. 
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Table A 3.5. Virus symptoms observeu In lowland potato fields in
 
spring crops 1979-83
 
Severe MIld Leaf Total Number of
 
mosaic a/ mosaic a/ roll virus observations b/
 
1979 	 27 14 25 66 

1980 	 14 14 16 44 36
 
1981 	 10 11 21 42 35
 
1982 	average 
 3 6 9 18 25
 
own seed 4 10 29 44 4
 
purchased 2 5 5 12 21
 
1983 	average 3 8 15 26 10
 
own seed 4 12 34 49 
 4
 
purchased 2 5 3 10 6
 
Source: Derived from AES Annual Res.!arch Reports. a/ The term
 
mosaic indicates the presence of Potato Viruses X or Y. b/ No
 
rigorous sampling procedure was used to select fields for observa­
tion. Hence, while these figures reflect the general decline since
 
1979, they should not be interpreted to be precise estimates of
 
virus levels in farmers' fields.
 
Table A 3.6. Percent total virus infection and relative yield of
 
Alpine and lowland seed planted at Alpine Experiment
 
Station 1966
 
Seed 	source Total virus Relative yield
 
(%) 	 (%) 
Alpine area 
 23 	 100
 
Lowlands 	 95 
 34
 
Source: Choi Chung Ii and Kang, Eung Hee. "Some experiments on
 
potato virus." Alpine Experiment Station Annual Research Report
 
(Taekwanryong,. 1966).
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Annex 4. Prices 
T4Ae A 4.1. Amzil amnw Ixrir 1fii, eh mt- ard pria- cf wvd wrdcmim pxotrzm 11-0 
Wn1.- ile mw'1vd F trap$V C wj;. :'W, W/-3.75ky, oza~r' Us& 1Alattve ptutrtlm 
total f.-d (l'ceI(f) CWAIZ;) i~ r~tmn9 "~ntr" X ptar ctat- 1 re 9/ w * lO, tR*10' 
1%51 6.4 t.. 27.5 .X .CY# 6,419 50.35 
1q2 
I'M 
,.1 
8.(-, 
3. 
3:.. 
T1370 
v.o 
27 
. , ") 
0.C6 
0.0) 
5,718 
5,421 
43.96 
41.70 
144i 12.0 7. 4 213-8 .,7 1,()3 0.07 7,912 37.01 
I10,f5 13.0 7. 5." 2i.3 I1 914 0.05 8,051 33.23 
VIW 14.0 '.9 :.'71.31 2 31 0.05 9,545 IS.18 
19b7 
19, 
1 
'v.1 
.. 
".7 6.3 
52.5 
7:9.6 
h. 
1 1)13 
8. 
77 
2C,3 
1,,955 
0.06 
0.0C6 
0.08 
0.10 
141 9,209 Y,.O(. 
186 9,53 34 50 
15M 1,I !I., :M40".?2. 0 573 [(Ir1 0.05 0. 193 183 8,630) .(Y.0 
14,3 14.0.) i, !(,., 31. r' ' 52 i,"fi 0.05 0.12 237 10,02" 32.21 
1371 .0 4.. 13.')I _qq.2 ;N 1-2 -05 1,739 0.06 0.13 27.1 12,7W/. . 94 
Ir7 7L(. .. 739 25.9 ,F 174 677 1,1g 0.07 0.12 1'3 13,X) 33.61 
1973 24.1) .q. 7.:, 313 .2 105 81 1,144 0.10 0.13 1',017.KA 44.M 
1974 3.0C)." 0.7' ', 211 13 Qio 1,13 0.14 0.21 145 25,39 6%93 
1975 41.0 3Q.0 :N.3 48',.0 195 33 64) I,Ch) 011 0.17 157 Y,,338 70.95 
1976 -3.0 47.) ,. ' .2Al 32, 732 912 0.14 0.18 125 39,44 81.50 
1977 5..0 5'.0 41.3 IX,'.0 y.5 3W, 835 935 0.19 0.21 112 51,332 106.05 
1078 61.) 71.0 53.6 /1'/.f3 612 It ) 1,141 1,C)1 0.Y. 0.31 93 49,625 102.53 
197) 27.71 R.O 59.,. 4P/.0 72 776 1,272 1,306 0.40 0.43 107 68,853 142.26 
18]w 102., 1010 7.4 637.4 667 1,(T 93 1,353 0.29 0.44 151 78,752 29.65 
lIWI 12 .0 121.0 92.8 611.3 1 1,226 74 3 1,333 0.27 0.48 179 99,181 145.64 
19R2 12f.0 1IM.0 99.3 731.1 539 1,7n 54 3 1,230 0.20 0.45 227 7,/403 105.87 
1%63 126.0 L.0 101.4 775.8 1) 1,2f, 659 1,250 0.23 0.44 190 83,660 107.84 
1054 127.0 i2.0 :M,7 a86-0 6A 1, 77 651 1,24i8 0.22 0.42 1M 76,205 94.55 
1985 I3.0 81.0 876 1,474 876 1,474 168 
K99 1,513 
Sax= 4T-. S[ai:Icl Yehrk A iculVtie, Fcmtr, xd FI-4vres (SAj,various )"=) ad in~t Hxotry Fu-d. trrenirianl Fimni­
cal Sttistcs. 1.6. a! (Sefl rntam frIp.tabbe poltao pdrr) ,103. 
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1I1e A 4.2 	 Amial axz fmm-Wfr pcm of selecbe agr-otiaim fkfrtis M96-84 (arnmat 
WAg) 
Rice 
9.et native nc (vhres 
Potato lfxtato varfet e: varfetics barley Corn Tomto allxf Raiia Caia 
1961 5 20 13 10 8 5 3 7 
1962 7 5 15 11 11 4 4 8 
1%3 12 5 34 25 17 22 7 6 12 
1%4 L5 11 43 32 2P 30 12 8 13 
1%5 14 8 40 22 19 30 9 7 18 
1966 14 9 42 20 24 18 9 7 13 
1967 16 47 25to 25 20 14 11 30 
1 9 15 11 55 28 27 23 12 11 18 
1969 14 13 68 34 26 30 13 13 14 
197- 16 15 76 3q 28 2 25 21 22
 
1971 21 19 
 96 54 33 23 20 18 34
 
19,2 29 23 122 71 41 /0 17 14 22
 
1973 38 29 128 	 73 49 41 T) 18 29
 
1974 5) 45 184 92 70 61 28 29 57
 
1975 52 51 233 129 84 72 45 40 46
 
1976 69 62 281 
 131 93 95 38 37 65
 
1977 92 82 311 196 105 
 11 76 68 81
 
1978 163 97 
 3W4 a25 119 179 9 62 135
 
1979 .94 115 472 252 130 
 258 79 68 107
 
19w) 178 127 
 611 501 316 195 235 77 72 104
 
1981 184 166 695 619 367 
 214 221 90 94 139 
1982 144 163 718 646 417 210 160 72 61 72 
1983 178 140 735 638 428 234 239 92 70 117 
1984 175 157 754 655 442 276 215 70 67 139 
Scanxm W4F. 	 Statistical Yembook of iAculture, Forestryand Fisurjes (Seoul, various ears) and 
Inteniatlcml Mmetary F r. lnterthcml Framlal Statistics. 1985. 
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Table A 4.3. With)1 awnl'r (-dalat fma-1~t_ t rno, 19124- (V/3.3 )I) _r 
19'7 I73 1174 19; 197, 1977 1't,8 1979 ifl) 1' 1 I'Q 1913 1M IT5 1972-76 1977-81 1IQ-.5 
•--ury 6% ,4- , 3 , r I ,53 ,,35 1,(Y.9 :.III 1ki &7 712 937Fpbn43 67 ,5 )9 955 750PI., ,7 817 "?9 1,in 7,4>I,27 24' 723 A)37 937 779 1ri1 76M 8rch24 1,!', P. 653 18 331 1,319 1, !, 1,9m, 7-11
.apri T) 871 IJh i 3r 85 8 ) c37 19 117/8 834J , ) 33 ',,/ , 1,2 .3 7Z5 1 37 973f3 1,2777 5'3 11 
7&3f; 17 Pv,I, IA, W, i, Z,23 :,0!0 111" 73719 3325 '1,' 'e 745 1,71 8i 145 a1h- 1, ) ,2, 9-NA 911I 3 6,13lily '3C 735 7 '" '8 14141 &-' 787712 1,174 1,173 7:11 7 " 535 673 6,S 87 5%7!it,, /5) , 77 783 1,1l , ICJ) 2/' ({3 1/".1 577 749 (t7 713 56'. 5r 911 F, "4 15 1, -4 1,117 1!0 745(0tW7r 72' .. 9 537 743 f815 757 1329 658/1 45 7!R29 7 1,2Nq 1,127 947 631 57, (63 632 9C3 03 78 6¢;272 
'.B 1,331 1,11 
-3 673 r91 /62 .72 927 835"' 1,0,1hrr r2q , 5!,(' 1,25 1,72 )53 7-5 6'? )1 723l,912 673 F"', 7.18 FfY I12O 7R5 
.iR 19 f-I )h/ 1., 17 :3 :f) 41 1' 59 72 93I 93 101 11 103
 
v,' 6 379 
 43 1,45i ,07 1,22q I,031 N5.1i ,t (2 711 91211T) 85 , 103[r- M2/,159 3 99 216 134 181 165 135 115 113 148Cv 67 75 1139 10 LS '6 7 11 3 I 18 21 24 17 16 16 169 745l1n /1 1012 1,148 871 F1 1,Q211,295 1, 1 1,2A7 1,(f,5,lnlrir fyT, 7.15 772 518 735 937 RV. 1,2"7 F') 1145 %7653 712 7H35 1,113 :n (X3f 3;3 4f, 535 673i( 655 879 547 
voutfm 11ntkrnl AgrmIaural (k'tYttve Rl'r-t rn. l RthlyE _E ( 4w1c,ars) -lrdArty( Tihle A 4.1.m 
a./ l0r-M fir-m-te prx-ce for grail A rntat4 &'flatod by the ini of all yricn rmelvai by farmiT (19810). b/ FR­ ixnim of all prices reovalbyfa urs. 
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